Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
(1978)
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Rule of Law:
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or destroy its critical habitat. This duty is absolute and applies regardless of a project's stage of completion or the extent of prior resource commitment.
Facts:
- In 1967, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, began constructing the Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project on the Little Tennessee River.
- By 1973, the project was substantially underway with millions of dollars already expended.
- In August 1973, Dr. David Etnier discovered a previously unknown species of fish, the snail darter, in the portion of the river that would be impounded by the dam.
- In December 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
- In October 1975, the Secretary of the Interior formally listed the snail darter as an endangered species under the ESA.
- The Secretary determined that the Tellico Dam would create a reservoir that would completely inundate the snail darter's only known habitat, resulting in the total destruction of the species.
- TVA's efforts to transplant the snail darter population to another river were not deemed a success or a sufficient alternative by the Secretary.
- Despite these findings, TVA intended to complete and operate the dam, which was by then nearly finished at a cost of over $100 million.
Procedural Posture:
- Hiram Hill and other concerned citizens filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
- The plaintiffs sought an injunction to stop the completion and operation of the Tellico Dam, alleging it would violate the Endangered Species Act.
- The District Court denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint, concluding Congress did not intend the Act to halt a project so far advanced.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, finding the Act's language was mandatory, and remanded the case with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against the TVA (appellee).
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 require a court to enjoin the completion and operation of a federal dam, which is virtually complete and has received continued congressional funding, when its operation would destroy the critical habitat of a known endangered species?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
Yes, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires a court to enjoin the project. The language of the statute is plain and admits of no exception, affirmatively commanding all federal agencies to insure that actions carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intentionally removed qualifying language like 'insofar as is practicable,' consciously deciding to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies and to halt the trend of extinction 'whatever the cost.' Continued congressional appropriations for the Tellico project do not create an implied repeal of the ESA, as repeals by implication are strongly disfavored and there is no clear and manifest legislative intent to do so. The role of the courts is to enforce the statute as written, not to balance the equities or substitute their judgment for Congress's policy determination that the value of endangered species is 'incalculable.'
Dissenting - Justice Powell
No, the Act should not be interpreted to apply to a project that is substantially complete when the threat to a species is discovered. Such a literalist construction produces an absurd result that Congress could not have intended, essentially giving the Act a retroactive effect. The statutory term 'actions' should be read prospectively to apply only to activities where an agency has reasonable decision-making alternatives available. The legislative history lacks any indication that Congress considered the possibility of halting nearly-completed projects. Furthermore, Congress's repeated appropriations for the dam, made with full awareness of the snail darter conflict, strongly corroborate the view that it did not intend for the ESA to prevent the project's completion.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No, the Endangered Species Act does not strip federal courts of their traditional equitable discretion to grant or deny an injunction. The Act's provision authorizing citizen suits to 'enjoin' violations does not mandate the automatic issuance of an injunction upon finding a violation. Citing 'Hecht Co. v. Bowles,' he argues that courts retain their power to balance the equities and consider the public interest. The District Court properly exercised this discretion by concluding that the substantial public harm from halting the $100 million project outweighed the interest in preserving the snail darter's habitat, and its refusal to issue the injunction was not an abuse of discretion.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established the formidable power of the Endangered Species Act, confirming that its mandate to protect species is an absolute command, not a guideline for courts to balance against economic or other interests. The ruling solidified the principle of legislative supremacy, affirming that courts must enforce the plain meaning of a statute, even if it leads to seemingly unreasonable or costly outcomes. 'TVA v. Hill' set a major precedent in both environmental law and statutory interpretation, forcing federal agencies to prioritize species preservation above their own missions and projects, and it remains a cornerstone of environmental litigation today.
