Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Michael Howe
Filed: May 14, 2025 (2025)
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Rule of Law:
Private plaintiffs cannot enforce Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Section 2 does not unambiguously confer an individual federal right enforceable under § 1983, as required by the Gonzaga v. Doe standard.
Facts:
- In 2021, North Dakota’s Legislative Assembly adopted a redistricting map for state legislative districts.
- This 2021 redistricting map allegedly diluted the voting strength of Native Americans in the state.
- Specifically, the map placed the Turtle Mountain Reservation in subdistrict 9A, but divided some of the Tribe's trust lands into subdistrict 9B along with portions of Towner and Cavalier Counties.
- The Spirit Lake Reservation was placed entirely in district 15.
- Members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the Spirit Lake Tribe, and individual Native American voters believed these redistricting decisions harmed their ability to elect their preferred representatives.
Procedural Posture:
- In 2021, the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the Spirit Lake Tribe, and three individual Native American voters (Plaintiffs) sued Michael Howe, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of North Dakota (Defendant), in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.
- The plaintiffs alleged that the 2021 redistricting diluted Native American voting strength in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and sought enforcement through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The Secretary of State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that § 2 did not permit a private right of action and could not be enforced through § 1983.
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs could enforce § 2 of the Act through § 1983.
- After a bench trial, the district court ruled on November 17, 2023, that the 2021 redistricting map violated § 2 and issued a permanent injunction.
- The district court ordered North Dakota’s Legislative Assembly to adopt a remedial map within approximately one month.
- After the Legislative Assembly failed to adopt a remedial map by the deadline, the district court ordered the Secretary of State to adopt the plaintiffs’ proposed map for the November 2024 election.
- The Secretary of State (Defendant-Appellant) appealed the district court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing the district court erred in finding private plaintiffs could enforce § 2 through § 1983 and erred on the merits of the § 2 violation.
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Issue:
Does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unambiguously confer an individual federal right that private plaintiffs can enforce through 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Opinions:
Majority - Gruender, Circuit Judge
No, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not unambiguously confer an individual federal right that private plaintiffs can enforce through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court affirmed its prior holding in Arkansas State Conference NAACP v. Arkansas Board of Apportionment that § 2 does not provide an implied private right of action, noting that the inquiry for § 1983 enforceability overlaps in requiring a federal right. Applying the stringent Gonzaga v. Doe standard, which demands an "unambiguously" conferred individual right, the court found that § 2 "focuses on both" the individuals protected ("right of any citizen") and the entities regulated ("any State or political subdivision"). This dual focus results in "mixed signals" about legislative intent, meaning Congress did not speak with a "clear voice" manifesting an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights. The court distinguished Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, stating that in Talevski, the reference to regulated parties did not cause a "material diversion" from the focus on individual rights, whereas § 2's plain text explicitly focuses on what states cannot do as the subject of its prohibition. The court also rejected arguments that the mere use of the word "right" is sufficient in itself, or that Gonzaga's applicability is limited to statutes enacted under the Spending or Commerce Clauses. Therefore, plaintiffs are within the "general zone of interest" but lack an unambiguously conferred individual right enforceable under § 1983.
Dissenting - Colloton, Chief Judge
Yes, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 confers an individual federal voting right that private plaintiffs can enforce through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chief Judge Colloton argued that § 2 unambiguously confers an individual voting right, noting that subsection (a) expressly forbids "a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote" and subsection (b) refers to "members of a class of citizens protected." This language clearly focuses on the benefited class. The dissent critiqued the majority's reliance on Arkansas State Conference, calling its statements on individual rights "indeterminate dicta" that ignored Talevski's clarification that a statute's consideration of regulated actors does not negate a clear focus on rights bearers. The dissent also rejected the argument that § 2 primarily focuses on regulated entities, citing Talevski and analogous VRA provisions like the Materiality Provision. It noted that the federalism concerns animating Gonzaga (which dealt with a Spending Clause statute) are less forceful for laws enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments. Since a right is conferred, it is presumptively enforceable under § 1983 unless Congress explicitly precluded it. The dissent found no "comprehensive enforcement scheme incompatible with individual enforcement," as the Attorney General's authority to sue under § 12 comfortably coexists with private § 1983 actions. The dissent would also have affirmed the district court's findings on the merits regarding the Thornburg v. Gingles preconditions, finding no clear error.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the avenues for private citizens to challenge vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act within the Eighth Circuit. By holding that VRA Section 2 does not unambiguously confer an individual right enforceable via § 1983, the court aligns with its prior ruling that Section 2 does not contain an implied private right of action, effectively closing both major pathways for private litigation in the circuit. This creates a circuit split, as other courts have permitted such suits, increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court review and potentially impacting voting rights enforcement nationwide, shifting primary enforcement responsibility for § 2 away from private litigants to the Attorney General in the Eighth Circuit.
