Turner v. Rogers
131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4566 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically require a state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support. However, the state must have in place alternative procedural safeguards to ensure a fundamentally fair determination of the defendant's ability to pay before incarceration may be ordered.
Facts:
- In June 2003, a South Carolina family court ordered Michael Turner to pay $51.73 per week in child support to Rebecca Rogers for their child.
- Over the next three years, Turner repeatedly failed to make the required payments and was held in contempt on five separate occasions.
- After being released from a six-month jail sentence in 2006, Turner remained in arrears on his child support payments.
- A new contempt hearing was held on January 3, 2008, at which both Turner and Rogers appeared without legal representation.
- At the hearing, Turner stated he had been addicted to drugs, broke his back after getting clean, and had applied for disability and SSI benefits.
- The family court judge did not ask Turner any follow-up questions about his financial situation or his ability to make payments.
- The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to twelve months in jail, without making an express finding on the record that Turner had the ability to pay his support arrearage.
Procedural Posture:
- The South Carolina Family Court found Michael Turner in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and sentenced him to 12 months in jail.
- Turner, the appellant, appealed the contempt order to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the U.S. Constitution entitled him to appointed counsel at the hearing.
- The South Carolina Supreme Court, as the state's highest court, rejected Turner's claim and affirmed the family court's order, holding there was no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings.
- Turner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted to resolve a conflict among state and federal courts on the issue.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support, where the defendant faces potential incarceration?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. The Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel in civil child support contempt proceedings to an indigent individual facing incarceration, particularly where the custodial parent is also unrepresented. However, due process does require that states provide alternative procedural safeguards to ensure the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. The court reasoned by applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. The private interest at stake—physical liberty—is profound. However, two countervailing considerations are significant: 1) requiring counsel for the noncustodial parent when the custodial parent is unrepresented could create an 'asymmetry of representation' that makes proceedings less fair and efficient for the family needing support, and 2) alternative procedural safeguards can adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. These safeguards must include (1) adequate notice that the defendant’s ability to pay is the critical issue, (2) a fair opportunity to present relevant financial information, often through a standardized form, (3) an opportunity at the hearing to respond to questions about financial status, and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay. Because Turner received neither counsel nor these alternative safeguards, his incarceration violated the Due Process Clause.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The Due Process Clause does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, and the analysis should end there. The dissent argues that there is no originalist or historical basis for such a right in civil contempt cases. Furthermore, finding a due process right to counsel in all cases involving potential incarceration would render the Sixth Amendment's specific guarantee of counsel in 'criminal prosecutions' superfluous. The majority compounded its error by vacating the judgment based on an 'alternative procedural safeguards' theory that was not raised by the parties but was introduced solely by an amicus curiae brief from the United States. This violates the Court's practice of not deciding cases on issues that were not litigated below or presented in the petition for certiorari. Finally, the dissent criticizes the majority's use of the Mathews v. Eldridge test for failing to account for the significant interests of the child and custodial parent who depend on the enforcement of support orders.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant middle-ground precedent for civil contempt proceedings involving indigent defendants. While it declines to extend the automatic right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright to this civil context, it constitutionalizes a set of minimum procedural requirements. The holding effectively creates a new due process floor, mandating that courts actively and explicitly assess a defendant's ability to pay before ordering incarceration. This prevents the jailing of individuals solely for their poverty ('debtors' prison') without imposing the financial and administrative burden on states of providing counsel in every child support contempt case, especially where the proceedings are between two unrepresented private parties.
