Turner v. Jordan
1997 WL 790357, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 633, 957 S.W. 2d 815 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A psychiatrist has an affirmative duty to protect a foreseeable, readily identifiable third party from a patient who the psychiatrist knows or should know poses an unreasonable risk of harm. A negligent defendant's fault cannot be reduced by comparing it to a third party's intentional tort if the intentional act was the specific, foreseeable risk the defendant had a duty to prevent.
Facts:
- Tarry Williams, diagnosed as bipolar and manic, had a history of hospitalizations at Hubbard Hospital and had previously been found to be a danger to others.
- In April 1990, during a prior hospitalization, Williams had attempted to attack the defendant, Dr. Harold Jordan, with a table leg.
- On March 4, 1993, Williams was admitted to Hubbard's psychiatric ward again, having not taken his prescribed lithium for over a week, and was observed to be delusional and disorganized.
- On March 5, 1993, after a treatment team meeting, Dr. Jordan wrote in Williams's chart that he was 'aggressive, grandiose, intimidating, combative, and dangerous.'
- In the same note, Dr. Jordan indicated a plan to discharge Williams soon by allowing him to sign out against medical advice (AMA).
- That evening, around 11:30 p.m., Williams attacked and severely beat the plaintiff, Emma Turner, a nurse on the psychiatric ward.
Procedural Posture:
- Emma Turner sued Dr. Harold Jordan for medical negligence in the state trial court.
- At trial, the court instructed the jury that it could allocate fault between the negligence of Dr. Jordan and the intentional conduct of the non-party patient, Tarry Williams.
- The jury returned a verdict for Turner and allocated 100 percent of the fault to Dr. Jordan.
- The trial court, acting as the 'thirteenth juror,' disapproved of the jury's fault allocation and granted Dr. Jordan's motion for a new trial.
- The Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court, the state's highest court, granted an appeal to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a psychiatrist, who knows a hospitalized patient is dangerous, have a duty of care to a hospital nurse, and if so, may the psychiatrist's negligence be compared with the patient's intentional violent act to apportion fault?
Opinions:
Majority - Anderson, Chief Justice
No, a psychiatrist's negligence may not be compared with the patient's intentional act under these circumstances, because the psychiatrist did have a duty of care to the nurse. A psychiatrist owes a duty of care when a special relationship with a patient exists and the psychiatrist knows or should know that the patient poses an unreasonable risk of harm to a foreseeable, readily identifiable third party. Here, Dr. Jordan knew of Williams's violent history and present dangerousness, making the risk to hospital staff like Turner foreseeable. Given this duty to prevent the very harm that occurred, it would be unfair and contrary to public policy to allow the negligent psychiatrist to reduce his liability by blaming the patient for the foreseeable intentional act. Comparing negligence and intentional torts is impractical as they differ in kind, not just degree, and allowing such a comparison would disincentivize defendants from fulfilling their duty to prevent foreseeable harm.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant precedent in Tennessee by adopting a 'Tarasoff-style' duty for psychiatrists, extending it to a foreseeable class of victims like hospital staff, not just specifically identified individuals. More importantly, it carves out a major exception to the state's comparative fault doctrine established in McIntyre. The holding prevents a negligent defendant from shifting blame to an intentional tortfeasor when the defendant's very duty was to prevent that foreseeable intentional act, profoundly impacting professional liability, negligent security, and other cases where a defendant has a protective duty.
