Turner v. Ferrin

Montana Supreme Court
232 Mont. 146, 45 State Rptr. 946, 757 P.2d 335 (1988)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When real property is sold "in gross" (as a whole parcel rather than by acre), a variation in acreage is not grounds for contract rescission unless the discrepancy is material and substantial, or if the vendor cannot convey merchantable title and the buyer proves the defect as fact.


Facts:

  • Steve and Debra Ferrin owned an irrigated ranch near Miles City, Montana, the precise acreage of which was later disputed (approximately 96 acres as listed in the contract, but later claimed by Turners to be as small as 90 acres).
  • On September 13, 1982, David and Patricia Turner signed a buy-sell agreement, prepared by Steve Ferrin, who was also a real estate broker, to purchase the property for $230,000.
  • On October 12, 1982, the Turners paid a $100,000 down payment, and all parties executed a contract for deed, which described the property as "96.73 acres, more or less."
  • The Turners moved onto the property in October 1982 and subsequently spent $26,815.69 on improvements.
  • The Turners timely made annual payments of $16,133.97 in 1983 and 1984, but failed to make the 1985 payment.
  • On December 24, 1985, the Turners and Ferrins entered into an accommodation agreement extending the time for the 1985 payment, but the default was not cured.
  • The property description in the contract for deed, and later in the warranty deed placed in escrow, included an exception for the Burlington Northern Railroad right-of-way, but the Turners alleged it actually contained a right of way for a state highway not properly excepted in the deed.
  • A survey commissioned by the Turners showed the tract contained 90.73 acres, which used the U.S. Highway 10 right-of-way as a boundary instead of the railroad right-of-way, resulting in a discrepancy of approximately six acres.

Procedural Posture:

  • Prior to a scheduled forfeiture date, the Turners filed an action for declaratory judgment in a state trial court (District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District), attempting to have the contract declared a mortgage, thereby entitling them to a right of redemption and occupancy.
  • The Ferrins were granted summary judgment on the declaratory judgment issue.
  • The Turners then filed for Chapter 11 relief in Bankruptcy Court.
  • The Turners pursued rescission of the contract in Bankruptcy Court, but the cause was remanded to the Montana State District Court due to mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(c)(2).
  • An amended complaint was filed by the Turners on March 19, 1987, in the District Court, alleging for the first time an acreage shortfall and issues with the warranty deed's description and recordability.
  • A bench trial was held on September 18, 1987, in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Custer County.
  • On October 21, 1987, the District Court issued a judgment disallowing rescission, finding the Turners guilty of laches, that the Ferrins had given due notice of default, and ordering the Turners to cure the default within 30 days or face contract termination and forfeiture.
  • The Turners filed consolidated post-trial motions on October 30, 1987, seeking amendment of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, or in the alternative, a new trial.
  • The District Court denied these post-trial motions.
  • The Turners appealed to the Montana Supreme Court from the final order denying these motions and from the judgment; the Turners are the appellants and the Ferrins are the respondents.

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Issue:

1. Does a six percent acreage discrepancy in a real estate transaction, where the property was sold "in gross" and the buyers inspected the land, constitute a material mistake or substantial failure of consideration warranting rescission of a contract for deed? 2. Is a buyer entitled to rescission, or is a forfeiture by the seller improper, if the seller's title is allegedly unmerchantable due to an unrecordable deed, even without proof of county refusal to record or a defect making the property unidentifiable?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice L. C. Gulbrandson

1. No, a six percent acreage discrepancy in a real estate transaction, where the property was sold "in gross" and the buyers inspected the land, does not constitute a material mistake or substantial failure of consideration warranting rescission of a contract for deed. The Court affirmed the District Court's denial of rescission, finding that the sale was "in gross" because the contract described the property as "more or less" acreage, the price was a negotiated lump sum rather than per acre, and the Turners had inspected the property multiple times. Citing Hardin v. Hill, the Court reiterated that variations in acreage in sales in gross are generally not grounds for rescission unless the shortfall is material. The Court concluded that a six percent discrepancy was not material or substantial, noting that materiality for rescission in a sale in gross typically requires a much greater disparity, potentially approaching or exceeding 50 percent, as discussed in 1 A.L.R.2d 9 and Steward v. Jones. No fraud or other equitable grounds for rescission under Section 28-2-1711, MCA, were alleged or proven. The Turners received the property they bargained for. 2. No, a buyer is not entitled to rescission, and a forfeiture by the seller is not improper, merely based on an allegation that the seller's title is unmerchantable or the deed unrecordable, without proving that the deed is truly defective or unrecordable, or that the property is unidentifiable. The Court affirmed the District Court's grant of forfeiture. The Court distinguished prior cases like McCarthy v. Timberland Resources, Inc. and Timberland Resources, Inc. v. Vaught, where there was actual refusal to record by the county or a challenge to recording practices. Here, the Turners merely alleged the deed could not be recorded without proving this as a fact. The contract for deed itself put the Turners on notice to look for easements of record and visible easements, and David Turner admitted awareness of the highway and being shown the boundaries. The Court emphasized that "the crux of the issue is whether the property is identifiable." Since the Turners did not prove the Ferrins lacked merchantable title, the forfeiture was appropriate.



Analysis:

This case significantly clarifies the legal standards for rescission based on acreage discrepancies in real estate contracts, particularly for "sales in gross." It establishes a high bar for materiality, suggesting that minor variations are typically insufficient to warrant rescission, reinforcing the principle of caveat emptor when buyers have opportunities to inspect. The decision also strengthens the position of sellers in contracts for deed by requiring concrete proof of unmerchantable title or unrecordable deeds, rather than mere allegations, before a buyer can successfully challenge a forfeiture provision. This protects sellers from speculative claims and encourages buyers to conduct thorough due diligence.

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