Turner v. Bucher
308 So. 2d 270 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2318, a parent is strictly liable for damage caused by the tortious act of their minor child residing with them, even if the child lacks the capacity for discernment and regardless of any fault or negligence on the part of the parent.
Facts:
- Laura Wallace Turner, a sixty-two-year-old woman, was walking on a sidewalk in New Orleans.
- Six-year-old Gregory Bucher was riding his bicycle on the same sidewalk.
- Gregory Bucher struck Turner from behind with his bicycle.
- Turner sustained injuries as a result of the collision.
- The parties acknowledged that Gregory Bucher's conduct would have constituted negligence if he were an adult, but that as a six-year-old, he was incapable of legal fault.
Procedural Posture:
- Laura Wallace Turner and August Turner sued Francis Bucher and his insurer, Zurich Insurance Company, in the trial court.
- The plaintiffs initially alleged the child was negligent but later argued on appeal that the father was personally negligent in his supervision of the child.
- The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the denial of recovery, finding no independent negligence by the father.
- The plaintiffs, as applicants, sought and were granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the state's highest court, to review the appellate court's judgment.
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Civil Code Article 2318 impose strict liability on a parent for damages caused by the act of their minor child, even if the child is of such a tender age as to be legally incapable of fault?
Opinions:
Majority - Barham, J.
Yes, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2318 imposes strict liability on a parent for damages caused by the act of their minor child, regardless of the child's capacity for fault. The court determined that historical changes to the Louisiana Civil Code, specifically in 1825, intentionally removed the ability for parents to escape liability by proving they could not have prevented their child's act. This change, combined with shifting the basis of liability from the child's 'delict' to the 'damage' they occasioned, established a regime of strict liability. The court overruled its prior decision in Johnson v. Butterworth, which had held that parents were not liable for acts of children lacking discernment. Instead, the court reinstated the reasoning of the earlier Mullins v. Blaise case, finding that the law itself imputes fault to the parent. This parental liability can only be escaped by showing the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, the fault of a third person, or a fortuitous event.
Dissenting - Sanders, C.J.
No, a parent should not be held strictly liable for damages caused by a child who is legally incapable of committing a fault. The dissent argues that the majority's holding creates a new 'no-fault' liability that overrules a long line of jurisprudence. It contends that Article 237 of the Civil Code explicitly limits parental liability to 'offenses and quasi-offenses' committed by their children. If a child is too young to be capable of fault, they cannot commit a quasi-offense, and therefore, the parent should not be vicariously liable. The dissent criticizes the majority for creating a rule that is more stringent than that in France or in common law jurisdictions, which generally require fault on the part of the child.
Dissenting - Marcus, J.
No. The dissent states its agreement with the holding in Johnson v. Butterworth, which the majority overruled, and its progeny.
Dissenting - Summers, J.
No. The dissent concurs with the reasons assigned by the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant doctrinal shift in Louisiana tort law, establishing a pure strict liability regime for parents for the acts of their minor children. By expressly overruling the long-standing precedent of Johnson v. Butterworth, the court eliminated the child's capacity for discernment as a relevant factor in determining parental liability. This decision aligns parental liability with the strict liability standard for animal owners set forth in Holland v. Buckley, prioritizing victim compensation over traditional fault-based principles. Consequently, litigation in this area now focuses exclusively on the three narrow defenses available to parents: fault of the victim, fault of a third party, or a fortuitous event, rather than on the parent's supervision or the child's state of mind.
