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Tumey v. Ohio

Supreme Court of the United States
47 S. Ct. 437, 273 U.S. 510, 1927 U.S. LEXIS 708 (1927)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A criminal defendant’s trial violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the judge has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conviction.


Facts:

  • Tumey was charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of Ohio's Prohibition Act.
  • He was brought for trial before Mayor Pugh of the Village of North College Hill, who had jurisdiction over such offenses committed anywhere within the county.
  • Under a village ordinance, Mayor Pugh was entitled to his costs (approximately $12) as compensation for hearing the case, but only if he convicted the defendant.
  • If Tumey were acquitted, Mayor Pugh would receive no compensation for his judicial services.
  • The ordinance also directed that one-half of the fines collected from convictions were to be paid into the village treasury for general use.
  • Mayor Pugh, as the village's chief executive, was responsible for the village's finances and had previously stated he would operate the 'Liquor Court' if the village needed the funds.
  • The village had collected substantial sums from fines, which were used for village improvements and repairs.

Procedural Posture:

  • Tumey was tried, convicted, and fined $100 by Mayor Pugh in the Mayor's Court for the Village of North College Hill.
  • Tumey appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County (a state trial court of general jurisdiction), which reversed the Mayor's judgment on the grounds that the Mayor was disqualified.
  • The State of Ohio, as appellee, sought review in the Court of Appeals of the first appellate district of Ohio (an intermediate appellate court).
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and affirmed the original conviction from the Mayor's Court.
  • The Supreme Court of Ohio (the state's highest court) dismissed Tumey's subsequent appeal, stating that 'no debatable constitutional question was involved.'
  • Tumey then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of error.

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Issue:

Does a statutory scheme that compensates a village mayor for acting as a judge only when a defendant is convicted, and which allocates a significant portion of the collected fines to the village's treasury, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?


Opinions:

Majority - Chief Justice Taft

Yes. A statutory scheme that provides a judge with a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case, or which places the judge in a position with a strong official motive to convict, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found two reasons for the disqualification. First, Mayor Pugh had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, as he would only be paid his $12 fee upon conviction. This interest was not trivial and created a potential temptation to rule against the defendant. Second, the Mayor had a significant official interest as the village's chief executive. Because the village's treasury, which he was responsible for, received a substantial portion of the fines, he was in a position of being responsible for filling the coffers of the village by convicting defendants. This dual role as a partisan executive seeking revenue and a neutral judicial officer is inconsistent with due process. The defendant's right to an impartial judge is absolute, regardless of the evidence against him.



Analysis:

This case establishes a fundamental principle of judicial impartiality as a core component of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. It clarifies that bias can be structural, stemming not just from personal prejudice but from the financial or official arrangements under which a judge operates. The decision's significance lies in its holding that even a 'possible temptation' for bias is sufficient to violate due process, thereby setting a high standard for judicial neutrality. This precedent is crucial in challenges to the fairness of administrative tribunals and lower courts where the adjudicator may have institutional or financial ties to the prosecuting authority.

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