Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry
918 F.3d 537 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its terms possess a substantial core of understandable meaning, even if there is uncertainty at the statute's periphery. The availability of state judicial procedures, such as declaratory judgments, to clarify a statute's meaning at the margins can save it from a facial vagueness challenge.
Facts:
- The state of Indiana enacted a law making it a felony for a person to intentionally 'acquire, receive, sell, or transfer' fetal tissue from an abortion.
- The statute defines 'fetal tissue' to include 'tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted fetus.'
- Faculty members at Indiana University, including Dr. Debomoy Lahiri, conduct critical medical research on Alzheimer's disease that requires the use of tissue from aborted fetuses.
- The researchers receive small tissue samples from a federally regulated laboratory at the University of Washington, which obtains the tissue from lawful abortions with the woman's informed consent.
- As part of their research, the scientists culture cells from the tissue samples, causing them to multiply, and transfer the material between laboratories to collaborate with other institutions and comply with federal grant requirements.
- The researchers feared that their routine scientific activities of acquiring, receiving, and transferring this fetal tissue and its derivatives could subject them to felony prosecution under the new law.
Procedural Posture:
- Indiana University and three faculty members filed suit against two county prosecutors in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
- The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to prevent the enforcement of Ind. Code § 35-46-5-1.5, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague and violated several other constitutional provisions.
- The district court granted partial relief, finding the terms 'acquires,' 'receives,' 'transfers,' and the phrase 'any other part' to be unconstitutionally vague.
- The district court rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims but did not rule on the Takings and Commerce Clause claims.
- The district court entered a permanent injunction in the plaintiffs' favor, effectively rewriting the statute by striking the vague terms.
- Both the plaintiffs and the defendant prosecutors appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an Indiana statute that criminalizes the intentional acquisition, receipt, or transfer of 'tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted fetus' violate the Due Process Clause on grounds of vagueness?
Opinions:
Majority - Easterbrook, Circuit Judge.
No. The Indiana statute does not violate the Due Process Clause on grounds of vagueness because its challenged terms have a core of understandable meaning, and state judicial procedures are available to resolve any peripheral ambiguities. The words 'acquires,' 'receives,' 'transfers,' and the phrase 'any other part' are ubiquitous in the law and have a substantial, ascertainable meaning. While there may be uncertainty at the margins—such as whether passing a pipette constitutes a 'transfer' or if cell lines are considered 'any other part'—such edge questions do not render a statute facially unconstitutional. The proper remedy for this uncertainty is not to invalidate the law, but for the plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment in Indiana state court to clarify the statute's application to their specific conduct. The availability of this state-level process for interpretation saves the statute from this federal vagueness challenge.
Dissenting - Hamilton, Circuit Judge.
Yes. The Indiana statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is criminal and represents an improper delegation of legislative power to prosecutors and judges. The State’s own attempts to define the law’s scope in court by offering implausible, textually unsupported limitations demonstrate its deep ambiguity. The legislative history reveals that the bill's sponsors did not understand its broad reach, believing it only criminalized the sale of fetal tissue. This vagueness is not at the 'periphery' but strikes at the core of the statute's application to legitimate medical research, leaving scientists to guess whether their work is a felony. Forcing citizens to file a series of lawsuits to determine the meaning of a criminal law abdicates the legislature’s fundamental responsibility to write clear statutes.
Analysis:
This decision significantly raises the bar for plaintiffs bringing facial vagueness challenges against state laws in federal court. It strongly endorses a principle of federalism, directing litigants to use state judicial processes, such as declaratory judgments, to clarify ambiguous statutes before a federal court will consider striking them down. The ruling signals that as long as statutory terms have a commonly understood 'core' meaning, uncertainty about their application in marginal cases is not a sufficient basis for a federal due process violation. This approach may make it more difficult to challenge broadly worded state statutes regulating controversial subjects on vagueness grounds in the future.
