Trupia v. Lake George Central School District
927 N.E.2d 547, 901 N.Y.S.2d 127, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which acts as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, is limited to cases involving inherent risks in voluntary athletic or recreational activities that are socially valuable. It does not apply to negate a defendant's duty in cases of negligent supervision where a child is injured during impulsive 'horseplay'.
Facts:
- Infant plaintiff Luke Anthony Trupia, who was under 12 years old, attended a summer program on defendants' property.
- The program was administered by the defendants, who were responsible for supervision.
- The complaint alleges that Luke was left wholly unsupervised at the time of the incident.
- While unsupervised, Luke rode down a bannister.
- Luke fell from the bannister and sustained serious injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- The infant plaintiff sued the defendants in Supreme Court (the trial court of first instance) for negligent supervision.
- Defendants moved for leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk.
- The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion.
- The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Judicial Department (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's order, denying the defendants' motion.
- The Appellate Division then granted defendants leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals (New York's highest court) and certified a question for its review.
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Issue:
Does the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk, which can completely bar a plaintiff's recovery, apply to a case involving an injury to a child from 'horseplay' allegedly caused by a defendant's negligent supervision?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Lippman
No. The affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk does not apply outside the limited context of athletic and recreational activities. The doctrine survived the enactment of New York's comparative negligence statute (CPLR 1411) not as a true affirmative defense based on a plaintiff's culpable conduct, but as a 'principle of no duty,' where a plaintiff's voluntary participation in a risky activity negates the defendant's duty of care. Its application has been justified for its utility in facilitating 'free and vigorous participation in athletic activities' that are both socially valuable and inherently risky. Extending the doctrine to a case of 'horseplay' resulting from negligent supervision would undermine the principles of comparative causation and eviscerate an educational institution's duty to supervise children. Children often act impulsively, and they cannot be deemed to have consented to the risks of their own misconduct, especially when that misconduct occurs due to a lack of supervision. Any fault on the part of the infant plaintiff should be considered under a comparative fault allocation, not used as a complete bar to recovery.
Concurring - Judge Smith
No. While concurring in the result, the case should be decided on narrower grounds. It is absurd to suggest that a 12-year-old child 'assumed the risk' that his supervisors would be negligent, as the very purpose of the duty to supervise is to protect children who lack mature judgment. The majority's opinion is an extended dictum that unnecessarily limits the assumption of risk doctrine to 'athletic and recreative activities.' This broad pronouncement raises more questions than it answers, such as what constitutes a 'recreative' activity and why sliding down a bannister for fun is of less social value than skiing. The court should not make such sweeping pronouncements in a case that does not require them.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine in New York, confining it to the context of socially valuable athletic and recreational activities. It reinforces the primacy of the state's comparative negligence statute by preventing assumption of risk from being used to reintroduce a complete bar to recovery in general negligence cases. The holding is particularly impactful in cases involving negligent supervision of minors, establishing that a child's own impulsive actions do not negate a supervisor's duty of care. The ruling creates a clear, albeit limited, sphere for the doctrine, though future litigation will likely address the concurring opinion's question of what specific activities qualify as sufficiently 'athletic or recreative' and 'socially valuable' to trigger the defense.
