Troncalli v. Jones
514 S.E.2d 478, 237 Ga. App. 10, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1381 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The enactment of a criminal stalking statute (OCGA § 16-5-90) does not automatically create a private civil cause of action for stalking in Georgia, as the violation of a penal statute does not inherently give rise to a civil tort.
Facts:
- On April 24, 1996, at a business-related party, Tom Troncalli approached Regina Jones, intentionally brushed against and touched her breasts, then followed her to another room and again intentionally touched her breasts.
- As Jones left the party in her car, Troncalli followed her closely for about three miles, running a stop sign and speeding when she did, even through a convenience store parking lot.
- Jones drove to a gas station where two police cars were parked, telling officers she was being chased; Troncalli arrived shortly after and made a threatening throat-cutting gesture at Jones.
- A week after the incident, Jones went to the police station and asked that an incident report be made and expressed interest in a warrant against Troncalli, though no charges were filed.
- The evening after the party, at a Chamber of Commerce meeting, Troncalli walked up behind Jones, put his mouth on her neck, and told her to be careful, then followed her when she tried to get away and laughed when she asked him to leave her alone.
- Around May 2, 1996, Troncalli came to Jones's house and banged loudly on the door for about five minutes, which her teenage daughter witnessed.
- Following these incidents, Jones developed shingles, experienced nausea and vomiting, became frightened and depressed, and sought psychological counseling.
- Other women, Paula Head and Tamara Roberts, testified at trial that Troncalli had also subjected them to unwanted attention, intentional touching of their breasts, and continued pursuit after being asked to stop.
Procedural Posture:
- Regina Jones sued Tom Troncalli in trial court, asserting claims for stalking, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and assault and battery, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- Troncalli filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim regarding the stalking count, which the trial court denied.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict on Jones’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The jury returned a general verdict in Jones' favor for $45,000 in compensatory damages, also finding that punitive damages were warranted and that Troncalli had acted with specific intent to cause harm.
- A separate punitive damages phase was held, and the jury awarded $245,891 in punitive damages.
- The trial court entered judgment based on the jury's verdicts.
- Troncalli appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, as the appellant.
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Issue:
Does the enactment of a criminal stalking statute (OCGA § 16-5-90) automatically create a private civil cause of action for stalking in Georgia?
Opinions:
Majority - Pope, Presiding Judge
No, the enactment of a criminal stalking statute in Georgia does not automatically create a civil tort of stalking. It is well-settled that the violation of a penal statute does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action for an injured party, as affirmed in cases like Cechman v. Travis. While OCGA § 16-5-90 establishes public policy, its provisions do not create a private right of action in tort. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Troncalli's motion for directed verdict on the stalking claim. Because the jury returned a general verdict that included this improper claim, the verdict cannot stand, as the court cannot determine if it was entered on a proper basis. The court also addressed other claims: The trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict on Jones's claim of invasion of privacy, as Troncalli's actions (unwanted touching, following, threatening gestures, coming to her home) constituted an "unreasonable intrusion" into her seclusion and solitude, offensive to a reasonable person. Similarly, the trial court properly denied a directed verdict on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; a jury could reasonably find Troncalli's conduct to be extreme and outrageous, and the resulting emotional distress severe. Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Troncalli's prior similar acts against Paula Head, as such evidence is admissible in intentional tort cases to show intent, motive, and bent of mind, especially when the defendant denies the alleged actions, and it is relevant for punitive damages.
Analysis:
This case clarifies a crucial point in Georgia tort law: criminal statutes, even those reflecting strong public policy, do not inherently create corresponding civil causes of action. This means plaintiffs must base their claims on established torts rather than directly on statutory criminal definitions. The ruling also reinforces the standards for demonstrating invasion of privacy (specifically intrusion upon seclusion) and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and provides guidance on the admissibility of prior similar acts in intentional tort cases to establish intent or pattern of conduct, which is particularly relevant in proving egregious behavior for punitive damages.
