Trisuzzi v. Tabatchnik
666 A.2d 543, 285 N.J. Super. 15 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under New Jersey's dog bite statute, a person who enters private property based on a reasonable belief that it is necessary to prevent serious harm to themself or a third person is considered to be 'lawfully' on the property under the doctrine of private necessity.
Facts:
- John and Elaine Trisuzzi were walking with their daughter on a public street which had no sidewalks, passing the home of Rita and Benjamin Tabatchnik.
- The Tabatchniks' eighty-five-pound German Shepherd ran towards Elaine and her daughter.
- John Trisuzzi perceived the dog to be in 'attack mode,' with its ears back and teeth bared.
- To protect his family, John Trisuzzi placed himself between the dog and his wife and daughter.
- A physical altercation ensued, during which Trisuzzi was bitten multiple times, particularly on his hands.
- John Trisuzzi claimed the entire incident occurred in the public roadway.
- Rita Tabatchnik claimed Trisuzzi entered her property's mulch bed, initiated the aggression by kicking the dog, and was never actually bitten.
Procedural Posture:
- John and Elaine Trisuzzi filed a civil lawsuit against Rita and Benjamin Tabatchnik in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division (trial court).
- John Trisuzzi's complaint included claims for statutory strict liability and common law negligence; Elaine Trisuzzi's claim was for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The trial judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss Elaine Trisuzzi's claim.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial on John Trisuzzi's claims.
- The jury returned a verdict of no cause for action in favor of the Tabatchniks.
- The Trisuzzis, as appellants, appealed both the jury verdict and the dismissal of Elaine's claim to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of private necessity, which privileges entry onto another's land to prevent serious harm, render a person 'lawfully' on the property for purposes of imposing strict liability under New Jersey's dog bite statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Arnold M. Stein, J.A.D.
Yes, the doctrine of private necessity can render a person lawfully on private property for the purposes of the dog bite statute. The trial court's jury instructions were insufficient because they failed to explain that a person is privileged to enter another's land if it reasonably appears necessary to prevent serious harm to oneself or a third person. The jury should have been instructed that if John Trisuzzi entered the Tabatchniks' property to protect himself or his family, his presence would be lawful. This principle, known as private necessity, is an extension of the rescue doctrine, articulated by Justice Cardozo's famous statement, 'Danger invites rescue.' By merely asking the jury to determine if Trisuzzi was 'lawfully' on the property without explaining this privilege, the court failed to mold the instruction to the material facts of the case. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Elaine Trisuzzi's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, finding that her husband's injuries were not sufficiently severe at the time of observation and her own emotional distress did not rise to the level of 'severe' as required by the test established in Portee v. Jaffee.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the term 'lawfully on or in a private place' within New Jersey's dog bite statute (N.J.S.A. 4:19-16). By incorporating the common law tort doctrine of private necessity into the statutory framework, the court broadens the scope of potential plaintiffs who can recover under the strict liability statute. It prevents dog owners from using a technical trespass defense when the plaintiff's entry was a reasonable reaction to a threat posed by the owner's dog. This precedent ensures that individuals acting as rescuers are not barred from recovery simply because they crossed a property line in a moment of perceived peril.
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