Tripp v. Huff
606 A.2d 792, 1992 Me. LEXIS 86 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A reservation of a right of way in a deed cannot create an express easement in favor of a stranger to the deed, and easements by necessity or implication require unity of title between the dominant and servient estates at the time of severance.
Facts:
- David Tripp owns a 20-acre property in Saco, located approximately 3,000 feet from the Jenkins Road.
- Tripp's property is the northerly half of a 40-acre parcel originally conveyed to Nicholas and Jeremiah Hearne in March 1833.
- On November 2, 1863, the 40-acre parcel was divided, granting Jeremiah Hearne sole ownership of the northerly half (Tripp's current land) and Nicholas Hearne sole ownership of the southerly half.
- A. Kenneth Huff, Alfred Barlow, and Joane Ouellette Barlow (defendants) own parcels of land situated between Tripp's property and Jenkins Road.
- Huff and Barlow derive title from a November 4, 1863 conveyance from Nicholas Hearne to James and William Andrews.
- The November 4, 1863 deed from Nicholas Hearne to James and William Andrews contained the language: “saving and excepting a way for Jeremiah Hearne and assigns to his lot lying back of and adjoining the above.”
- At the time Nicholas Hearne and Jeremiah Hearne divided the jointly owned 40-acre parcel, Nicholas Hearne was the sole owner of the property now owned by Huff and Barlow, over which Tripp claims a right of way.
Procedural Posture:
- David Lloyd Tripp commenced an action in Superior Court (York County) against A. Kenneth Huff, Alfred Barlow, and Joane Ouellette Barlow.
- Tripp sought a declaratory judgment to establish a right of way over the defendants' property and for injunctive relief.
- The case proceeded to a jury-waived trial.
- The Superior Court entered judgment for Huff and Barlow.
- Tripp, as appellant, appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (this court).
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Issue:
Does a deed's reservation of a right of way in favor of a stranger to the deed create an express easement, or can an easement by necessity or implication be established without unity of title at the time of property severance?
Opinions:
Majority - Collins, Justice
No, a reservation in a deed does not create an express easement for a stranger to the deed, nor can an easement by necessity or implication be established without unity of title at the time of property severance. The Court first addressed Tripp's claim for an express right of way based on the November 4, 1863 deed from Nicholas Hearne to James and William Andrews. Tripp acknowledged that the reservation for Jeremiah Hearne, a predecessor in title, was an easement in favor of a stranger to the deed, which under existing case law (`Fitanides v. Holman`) conveyed no property rights to Tripp. The Court declined to abandon this well-settled rule, emphasizing the importance of stare decisis in real property law to maintain certainty and predictability, citing `Brown v. Heirs of Maria Fuller`. Next, regarding easements by necessity and implication, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's finding that Tripp failed to prove their existence because the requisite unity of title did not exist when the Hearnes divided their jointly owned parcel. At the time of division, Nicholas Hearne was the sole owner of the property over which Tripp claimed a right of way, thus precluding a finding of common ownership necessary for such easements.
Analysis:
This case strongly reaffirms long-standing principles in real property law regarding easements, particularly the strict interpretation of reservations in deeds and the prerequisite of unity of title for implied easements. It underscores the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's commitment to stare decisis to maintain certainty and predictability in real property interests. The decision clarifies that the 'stranger to the deed' rule remains robust and that 'unity of title' is a non-negotiable prerequisite for establishing easements by necessity or implication. This case reinforces the need for clear and precise language in deeds to establish property rights and highlights the strict requirements for implied easements.
