Trevino v. Thaler
185 L. Ed. 2d 1044, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 3980, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The exception from Martinez v. Ryan, which excuses a procedural default for an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, applies not only when a state's law formally prohibits raising such claims on direct appeal but also when the state's procedural framework, by its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to do so.
Facts:
- Carlos Trevino was convicted of capital murder in a Texas state court and sentenced to death.
- During the penalty phase of his trial, Trevino's counsel presented only one witness, his aunt, to offer mitigating evidence.
- After his conviction, new counsel was appointed for Trevino's direct appeal; this counsel did not raise a claim that Trevino's trial counsel had been ineffective during the penalty phase.
- In his initial state collateral review proceeding, a third new counsel for Trevino also failed to raise a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances, such as evidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, head injuries, abuse, and cognitive impairments.
Procedural Posture:
- A Texas state jury convicted Carlos Trevino of capital murder and he was sentenced to death.
- Trevino's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
- Trevino filed a petition for state collateral relief (habeas corpus) in the state trial court, which was denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial.
- Trevino filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, raising for the first time a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence.
- The District Court stayed the case to allow Trevino to present the claim in state court, which held the claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the initial state habeas proceeding.
- The U.S. District Court then denied Trevino's federal habeas petition, ruling the claim was barred by the state procedural default.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the exception from Martinez v. Ryan did not apply in Texas. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the narrow exception established in Martinez v. Ryan, which excuses a procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim due to ineffective post-conviction counsel, apply in a state where the procedural framework does not formally prohibit raising such claims on direct appeal but makes it virtually impossible to do so in practice?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
Yes, the Martinez v. Ryan exception applies. A state procedural framework that does not offer a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claim on direct appeal is the functional equivalent of a system that formally prohibits it. The court reasoned that the Texas system, with its tight deadlines for new trial motions and the unavailability of the trial transcript, makes it 'virtually impossible' for appellate counsel to develop the record necessary to bring an IATC claim on direct appeal. Therefore, for practical purposes, the state collateral review proceeding is the first effective opportunity for a defendant to raise such a claim, and the ineffectiveness of counsel in that proceeding can establish 'cause' to excuse a procedural default.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Roberts
No, the Martinez v. Ryan exception should not apply. The Martinez holding was an intentionally 'narrow exception' that applied only where state law explicitly 'barred' a defendant from raising an IATC claim on direct appeal. Today's decision replaces that clear, administrable rule with a vague, malleable standard requiring federal courts to determine whether a state's system provides a 'meaningful opportunity' to raise a claim. This new test is opaque, will invite endless litigation, and undermines the principles of comity and finality that underlie the procedural default doctrine established in Coleman v. Thompson.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, the Martinez v. Ryan exception should not apply. This decision confirms the prediction from the dissent in Martinez that the supposedly narrow line drawn in that case lacked a principled basis and would not last. The Court is now extending a rule that was wrongly decided in the first place, further eroding established principles of federal habeas review.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the 'narrow exception' created in Martinez v. Ryan. It shifts the inquiry from a formalistic question about a state's procedural law (does it prohibit the claim?) to a functional, fact-intensive analysis of the state's procedural system (does it provide a 'meaningful opportunity'?). This expansion allows federal habeas petitioners in many more states to overcome procedural default on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The ruling prioritizes ensuring a forum for substantial constitutional claims over the state's interest in the finality of its judgments and the enforcement of its procedural rules.
