Towns v. Smith
05a0009p.06 (File Name) (2005)
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Rule of Law:
Defense counsel renders ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to reasonably investigate a known, potentially exculpatory witness, especially when that failure is not a reasoned strategic decision and there is a reasonable probability that such investigation would have led to a different trial outcome.
Facts:
- In 1982, Wilma Steward was robbed and murdered, and Roland Higgs, also robbed, was the sole eyewitness.
- Police arrested Michael Richard on an unrelated charge and found him in possession of the handgun used to shoot Steward.
- Michael Richard admitted to Sergeant Brantley that he drove the getaway car and that 'Willie and his brother' robbed and shot Steward.
- Police identified 'Willie' as Willie Towns, one of Parrish Towns's brothers, and arrested him.
- Michael Richard later identified the 'brother' involved as Kevin Towns, Parrish Towns's other brother, to Sergeant Sterr and Lieutenant Morrison.
- Police encountered Parrish Towns at the Towns residence; Parrish physically resembled Kevin Towns, both being 5'10" tall and 175 pounds.
- Roland Higgs, the eyewitness, tentatively identified Parrish in a lineup based on his height and weight, but explicitly stated he 'couldn’t be sure of any identification.'
- Parrish Towns was tried jointly with Willie Towns for the Steward murder, where his defense presented alibi witnesses (Marion Wimberly, Chester McCoy, Yolanda Wimberly, and Parrish's mother) who testified that he was helping a friend move during the time of the murder.
- Later, attorney Darwin Fair and an investigator, Michael Martin, interviewed Michael Richard, who stated he had personal knowledge that Parrish had nothing to do with the crimes and that he, Willie Towns, and Kevin Towns were the only ones involved, and that Richard had been willing to testify to Parrish's non-involvement at the original trial.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1983, Parrish Towns and Willie Towns were convicted of robbery and first-degree felony murder in state court.
- After state courts denied relief on his claims, Parrish Towns filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting various claims including ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
- The District Court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing primarily on Parrish Towns's actual innocence claim.
- The magistrate judge recommended, and the District Court concurred, that Parrish Towns had not met the high burden of proof required to excuse procedural default on actual innocence grounds.
- However, the District Court found Parrish Towns's ineffective assistance of counsel claim meritorious and conditionally granted his habeas petition, ordering the state to retry him within ninety days or release him from custody.
- David Smith, Warden, appealed the District Court's conditional grant of habeas corpus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the Warden was the Respondent-Appellant and Parrish Towns was the Petitioner-Appellee. Parrish Towns also filed a cross-appeal.
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Issue:
Does a trial counsel's failure to investigate a known witness, who had previously admitted involvement in the crime and implicated others while consistently exonerating the defendant, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, thereby warranting habeas relief?
Opinions:
Majority - Boyce F. Martin, Jr.
Yes, a trial counsel's failure to investigate a known witness, who had previously admitted involvement in the crime and implicated others while exonerating the defendant, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, warranting habeas relief. The court affirmed the district court’s conditional grant of Parrish Towns’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, applying the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington. First, counsel's performance was deficient because he made absolutely no attempt to interview Michael Richard, despite explicitly acknowledging the need to do so and requesting Richard be held in county jail for that purpose. A decision not to investigate a known and potentially important witness is objectively unreasonable, especially when made without undertaking a full investigation to assess the witness's credibility or the risks/benefits of their testimony. The Warden's speculative argument that Parrish might have told counsel Richard had damaging information was unsupported by the record, which consistently showed Richard exonerating Parrish and implicating Willie and Kevin. Second, Parrish suffered prejudice because there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, he would have been acquitted. Richard had consistently maintained to police and others that Parrish was not involved and was willing to testify to that effect; had counsel interviewed Richard, he would have likely discovered this and potentially called him. The prosecution’s case against Parrish was weak, relying solely on Higgs’s "shaky" and tentative eyewitness identification based only on physical resemblance to Kevin, coupled with strong alibi testimony for Parrish. A verdict weakly supported by the record is more likely to be affected by errors. The court also rejected the Warden's laches argument, noting that even if a timely-filed habeas petition could be dismissed on such grounds, the Warden failed to meet the heavy burden of showing particularized prejudice caused by delay and lack of reasonable diligence by Parrish.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the fundamental duty of defense counsel to conduct reasonable investigations into known, potentially exculpatory witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. It clarifies that a purportedly strategic decision not to call a witness is objectively unreasonable if made without an adequate prior investigation, particularly when the witness consistently provides exculpatory information for the client. The decision underscores that the prejudice prong of Strickland is more easily satisfied when the prosecution's case is weak and the neglected witness's testimony could have a substantial exculpatory impact. This case serves as an important precedent for future ineffective assistance of counsel claims, emphasizing that a failure to investigate can be a critical error leading to habeas relief, even if the witness later becomes unavailable or reluctant to testify without immunity.
