Town of Monroe v. Renz
1997 Conn. App. LEXIS 374, 46 Conn. App. 5, 698 A.2d 328 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies to bar the relitigation of an issue from a prior action even when a party's subsequent petition for discretionary appellate review in that prior action was denied. The preclusion exception for lack of review applies only when appellate review is unavailable as a matter of law, not when it is available but denied at the court's discretion.
Facts:
- Since the 1940s, a 133-acre property in the town of Monroe was used for sand and gravel excavation.
- After the operation began, Monroe enacted zoning regulations that established the area as a two-acre residential zone, making the existing excavation a valid prior nonconforming use.
- In 1973, Ronald Renz purchased the property and continued the sand and gravel operation.
- From 1973 to 1987, the operation remained essentially the same, excavating naturally occurring sand and gravel.
- By 1987, natural deposits were depleted, and market demand shifted from gravel to crushed stone.
- In 1988, to meet new demand, Renz installed a rock crusher and began blasting operations to supply it.
- The new operation involved monthly blasts using up to 28,000 pounds of explosives and constant drilling, which created sheer rock cliffs between 60 and 100 feet high.
Procedural Posture:
- The Town of Monroe issued a cease and desist order against Ronald Renz for illegally expanding a nonconforming use by commencing rock crushing and blasting.
- Renz appealed the order to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which upheld the order.
- Renz appealed the Board's decision to the Superior Court (trial court), which dismissed the appeal.
- Renz's petition for certification to appeal that dismissal was denied by the Appellate Court.
- In a separate action, Renz's application to the Planning and Zoning Commission for a rock crusher permit was denied, and his appeal of that denial to the Superior Court was dismissed.
- Renz's petition for certification to appeal that permit denial was also denied by the Appellate Court.
- The Town of Monroe then filed the present action in Superior Court, seeking a permanent injunction against Renz's operations.
- The trial court granted the permanent injunction for the Town, ruling that Renz was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the legality of his operation.
- Renz (appellant) appealed the trial court's grant of the permanent injunction to the Appellate Court of Connecticut, and the Town of Monroe (appellee) filed a cross-appeal.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of collateral estoppel preclude a party from relitigating an issue that was decided in a prior action, where the party's subsequent petitions for discretionary appellate review in those prior actions were denied?
Opinions:
Majority - Langenbach, J.
Yes. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does preclude a party from relitigating an issue under these circumstances. The court held that the denial of a petition for discretionary appellate review does not prevent a prior judgment from being considered final for the purposes of issue preclusion. The defendants argued that because their petitions for certification were denied in prior related cases, they were denied appellate review as a matter of law, thus preventing collateral estoppel under the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1). The court rejected this, distinguishing between being denied review 'as a matter of law' and having a petition for discretionary review denied. Citing the Restatement's commentary, the court found that since an avenue for review was available (the petition process itself), the denial did not prevent preclusion. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating whether their rock crushing was an illegal expansion of a nonconforming use. On the cross-appeal, the court found the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in vacating an attorney's fee award, denying daily fines, or refusing to order the rock crusher's removal, but did abuse its discretion by not ordering the defendants to provide information necessary for a restoration bond.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle of finality in litigation by clarifying the scope of collateral estoppel in jurisdictions with discretionary appellate review. It establishes that a lower court judgment is considered final for preclusion purposes once the opportunity for discretionary review is exhausted, even if review is denied. This prevents parties from re-litigating issues by arguing that the denial of certiorari or certification means the prior judgment was not truly final. The ruling reinforces judicial economy by preventing repetitive lawsuits and giving full preclusive effect to judgments that are not selected for higher review.
