Town of Griswold v. Camputaro
173 A.3d 959, 177 Conn. App. 779 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
A court may not deny a statutory motion to intervene as untimely when the original parties have violated court rules of practice regarding notice and scheduling, thereby depriving potential intervenors of a reasonable opportunity to file their motion in a pending proceeding. Parties entitled to notice may rely on official court calendar postings.
Facts:
- Pasquale Camputaro operated an earth products excavation and asphalt manufacturing facility on property in Jewett City, which was the subject of a zoning dispute with the Town of Griswold.
- In 1994, the Town's zoning enforcement officer issued a cease and desist order for the asphalt facility, which the operators contended was a legally existing non-conforming use.
- In 2014 and 2015, the Town received numerous public complaints that the facility's operation was not in compliance with a 1997 stipulated judgment that had settled the original dispute.
- Kathryn B. Londé, a member of the public, learned from the Judicial Branch website that motions in the old case were scheduled for a short calendar hearing on November 23, 2015, and she planned to attend to file a motion to intervene.
- On November 9, 2015, the Town of Griswold's board of selectmen authorized the negotiation of modifications to the 1997 judgment.
- Without any new public notice, the original parties to the case requested and were granted an expedited hearing on November 16, 2015, a week earlier than the publicly posted date.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1997, a stipulated judgment settled consolidated actions in the Superior Court between the Town of Griswold and Pasquale Camputaro regarding a zoning dispute.
- On October 28, 2015, the defendants in the dormant case filed motions to substitute a party and add a new party, which the clerk scheduled for a hearing on November 23, 2015.
- On November 12, 2015, the original parties jointly filed a motion to open and modify the 1997 judgment and requested the court place the matter on the November 16, 2015 calendar.
- On November 16, 2015, the trial court (Cosgrove, J.) granted the request, opened the 1997 judgment, and rendered a new stipulated judgment, effectively closing the case again on the same day.
- Kathryn B. Londé appeared on November 23, 2015, to intervene, learned the case had been closed, and filed her motion to intervene anyway. Jeffrey Ryan filed a similar motion on December 9, 2015.
- The trial court (Vacchelli, J.) heard arguments and denied the motions to intervene on the ground that there was no pending proceeding in which to intervene.
- The would-be intervenors, Londé and Ryan, appealed the denial of their motions to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a trial court improperly deny motions to intervene as untimely when the original parties, in violation of court rules of practice, expedite a hearing that simultaneously opens and closes a case, thereby depriving potential intervenors of the notice and opportunity to file their motion in a pending proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Lavine, J.
Yes. A trial court improperly denies motions to intervene under these circumstances because such a denial violates the intervenors' statutory rights to be heard. The original parties violated the court's rules of practice by requesting an expedited hearing without sufficient justification and without giving proper notice to the public, who were entitled to rely on the originally posted court calendar date. The court rules require motions to be filed at least five days before a hearing, a rule that was violated here. This procedural manipulation deprived the intervenors of their statutory right under General Statutes § 22a-19 to intervene in a pending proceeding and their right under § 8-8(n) to participate in the public hearing on a zoning settlement. The 'instantaneous' opening and closing of the case on the expedited date did not constitute the meaningful public hearing required by law for zoning matters. Therefore, the judgment must be undone to allow the intervenors a fair opportunity to participate.
Analysis:
This decision strongly affirms the principle that procedural rules ensuring notice and an opportunity to be heard are not mere technicalities, especially in public interest litigation like zoning and environmental cases. It establishes that parties cannot 'consent' to procedural shortcuts that effectively foreclose the statutory rights of potential third-party intervenors. The ruling empowers courts to look behind a technically final judgment and reopen it if it was obtained through procedural manipulation that undermined fairness and public participation. This precedent will make it more difficult for parties in land use disputes to reach 'side or secret settlements' without genuine public scrutiny.
