Toussaint v. Town of Harpswell
698 A.2d 1063, 1997 Me. LEXIS 195, 1997 ME 189 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under a broadly worded zoning ordinance defining a 'home occupation' as a business 'customarily conducted on... residential property,' a for-profit dog kennel may qualify if there is evidence of similar uses in the area. A zoning board's factual determination of compatibility with the neighborhood will be upheld on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence, even in the face of conflicting testimony.
Facts:
- In March 1995, Jane Waddle applied for and received a building permit to construct an addition to her home in Harpswell for 'indoor-outdoor kennels for our dogs.'
- After construction, Waddle began operating the Great Island Dog Kennel, a for-profit business with 11 dog runs and the capacity to board up to 15 dogs.
- The kennel is located in a mixed-use neighborhood of year-round homes and summer cottages.
- Donald and Marietta Toussaint, summer residents in the neighborhood, complained that 'almost continuous barking' from the kennel was annoying and disruptive to their enjoyment of the neighborhood.
- Other year-round residents stated that the kennel was not disruptive and the noise was reasonable compared to other sounds in the area, such as lobster boats and other neighborhood dogs.
- Waddle submitted a list of other dog kennels operating on residential properties in surrounding communities to show that such a use was customary.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald and Marietta Toussaint asked the Harpswell Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) to prohibit the operation of Jane Waddle's kennel.
- The CEO refused to take enforcement action.
- The Toussaints appealed the CEO's decision to the Town of Harpswell Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA).
- The ZBA, by a 2-1 vote, denied the Toussaints' appeal, finding the kennel was a permitted home occupation.
- The Toussaints sought judicial review of the ZBA's decision in the Superior Court for Cumberland County.
- The Superior Court reversed the ZBA's decision as an error of law and remanded the case for enforcement action against the kennel.
- Jane Waddle, as appellant, appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
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Issue:
Does a for-profit dog kennel qualify as a permitted 'home occupation' under a town zoning ordinance that defines such a use as an occupation 'customarily conducted on or in a residential structure or property' and is 'compatible with the residential use of the property and surrounding residential uses'?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, Justice
Yes, a for-profit dog kennel can qualify as a 'home occupation' under the Harpswell ordinance. The court reversed the lower court and upheld the Zoning Board's decision, finding it was not an error of law. The court's reasoning was twofold. First, the Harpswell ordinance's definition of 'home occupation' is broad, permitting businesses 'customarily conducted on residential property,' which is less restrictive than ordinances requiring a business to be conducted 'in a home.' Given the evidence Waddle presented of other kennels on residential properties, the Board could reasonably conclude this prong of the definition was met. Second, the question of whether the kennel is 'compatible' with the neighborhood is a factual determination for the Board. Since the record contained conflicting testimony from neighbors—some complaining of noise, others stating it was not disruptive—there was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion. The court emphasized that it will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board, which possesses greater familiarity with the community, when the Board's decision is supported by evidence in the record.
Analysis:
This case highlights the significant judicial deference afforded to local zoning boards in their interpretation of municipal ordinances and their factual findings. The decision demonstrates that the specific language of a zoning ordinance is paramount; the distinction between an occupation 'in a home' versus 'on residential property' was critical to the outcome. By upholding the board's decision despite conflicting evidence about the kennel's impact, the court reinforced the principle that a board's factual conclusion on issues like 'compatibility' will stand as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. This precedent gives local boards considerable latitude in permitting quasi-commercial activities in residential zones, provided their decisions are not arbitrary or completely unsupported by the record.
