Tony Lavan v. City of Los Angeles
693 F.3d 1022, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18639, 2012 WL 3834659 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect homeless persons from unreasonable seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property, requiring both reasonableness for seizures and due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard) before deprivation of property.
Facts:
- Nine homeless individuals, Appellees, reside on the streets of the Skid Row district of Los Angeles, an area with a high concentration of homeless persons.
- Appellees stored their personal possessions, including identification documents, medications, family memorabilia, and blankets, in mobile containers (EDAR shelters and distinctive carts) provided by social service organizations.
- On separate occasions between February 6, 2011, and March 17, 2011, Appellees stepped away from their personal property, leaving it on public sidewalks, to perform necessary tasks such as showering, eating, using restrooms, or attending court.
- City employees seized and summarily destroyed Appellees' mobile containers and their contents, permanently depriving them of their possessions, even though Appellees had not abandoned their property.
- On several occasions, Appellees and other individuals were present and informed City employees that the property was not abandoned, but the City still proceeded to seize and destroy it.
- The City acknowledged its policy and practice of seizing and destroying homeless persons' unabandoned possessions, citing Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) § 56.11, which prohibits leaving personal property on sidewalks.
Procedural Posture:
- On April 5, 2011, Appellees (Tony Lavan and others) sued the City of Los Angeles in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- On April 18, 2011, Appellees filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking an injunction to prevent the City from seizing and destroying their possessions without notice.
- On April 22, 2011, the district court granted Appellees’ application for the TRO, concluding that Appellees had established a likelihood of success on the merits for their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and that the City’s conduct, unless enjoined, would cause irreparable injury.
- On June 23, 2011, the district court issued a preliminary injunction on the same terms as the TRO, finding that Appellees had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the City violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The City of Los Angeles then appealed the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment protect homeless persons' unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property from unreasonable seizure, and does the Fourteenth Amendment require due process (notice and opportunity to be heard) before such property can be seized and summarily destroyed by the government, even when left on public sidewalks in violation of a municipal ordinance?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Wardlaw
Yes, the Fourth Amendment protects homeless persons' unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property from unreasonable seizure, and the Fourteenth Amendment requires due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard) before such property can be seized and summarily destroyed by the government, even when left on public sidewalks in violation of a municipal ordinance. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 'seizures' of property, and a 'meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests' is sufficient to trigger this protection, regardless of an expectation of privacy, as clarified in United States v. Jacobsen and Soldal v. Cook County. The Katz 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test was an addition to, not a substitution for, the common-law trespassory test for Fourth Amendment protections, as reiterated in United States v. Jones. Therefore, the City’s seizure and destruction of unabandoned property, even if in violation of an ordinance, meaningfully interfered with Appellees' possessory interests and was presumptively unreasonable given its immediate destructive nature, as a seizure lawful at its inception can become unreasonable through its manner of execution (citing Jacobsen). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Appellees have a protected property interest in the continued ownership of their personal possessions, derived from California law recognizing ownership rights in personal property (Cal. Civ.Code §§ 655, 663, 671). This property interest is not extinguished simply because the property is left unattended or in violation of a municipal ordinance; the government may not 'take property like a thief in the night' (Clement v. City of Glendale). Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government can permanently deprive individuals of property (Fuentes v. Shevin, Board of Regents v. Roth, United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop.). The City admitted it failed to provide any notice or opportunity to be heard before destroying the property, which poses an 'enormous risk of erroneous deprivation' and is particularly detrimental to vulnerable homeless individuals whose possessions may constitute everything they own. The court rejected the City’s request to create an exception to constitutional requirements for the belongings of homeless persons, affirming that the Constitution prohibits seizing and destroying their worldly possessions with impunity.
Dissenting - Judge Callahan
No, the Fourth Amendment does not protect homeless persons' unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property from unreasonable seizure, nor does the Fourteenth Amendment require due process before such property can be seized and summarily destroyed, when it is left unattended on public sidewalks in violation of a municipal ordinance and with clear warning signs. The pivotal question under both amendments is whether society would recognize the property interest as 'reasonably worthy of protection' when property is left unattended on public sidewalks in violation of the law and despite warnings. Under Katz, a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' is required for Fourth Amendment protection. By leaving their property unattended on public sidewalks, in clear violation of LAMC § 56.11, and in the face of numerous warning signs stating that property would be disposed of during scheduled clean-ups, Appellees forfeited any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy (citing Church v. City of Huntsville, United States v. Ruckman, and Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon). Soldal v. Cook County is distinguishable because the property in that case was legally situated. Public safety concerns, such as the potential for biohazards, weapons, or drug paraphernalia in unattended items on sidewalks, justify the City's interest in immediate removal and destruction, similar to unattended bags in airports. For the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, property interests are defined by 'existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law' (Board of Regents v. Roth). Society does not recognize a protected property interest that allows individuals to leave unattended personal property on public sidewalks. California Penal Code section 647c empowers cities to regulate conduct on sidewalks, supporting the City's authority. Finding such an interest would have far-reaching negative implications for cities' basic responsibility for public health and safety. Appellees failed to demonstrate any 'existing rules or understandings' beyond their own 'unilateral expectation[s]' to support their claim, thus failing the first step of the due process inquiry and making the second step unnecessary. Therefore, the district court misapprehended the law, and its ruling should be vacated.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the constitutional protections afforded to personal property, extending them to vulnerable populations like the homeless. It clarifies that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures is distinct from, and broader than, privacy interests, focusing on an individual's possessory rights. For the Fourteenth Amendment, it confirms that basic property interests persist despite municipal ordinance violations, demanding due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard) before permanent deprivation. The ruling limits municipal governments' ability to summarily dispose of unabandoned property without adhering to constitutional safeguards, compelling them to adopt more humane and legally compliant policies for managing public spaces and the belongings of their homeless residents. This decision sets a precedent requiring cities to balance public order with individual rights, even when dealing with items left on public property.
