Tompkins v. Cyr
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180, 1998 WL 21650, 995 F. Supp. 664 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment does not protect harassing and intimidating conduct, such as focused residential picketing, surveillance, and threats, from tort liability. Imposing damages for torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy based on such conduct is a permissible, content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of expression.
Facts:
- Norman T. Tompkins, a medical doctor who performed abortions as part of his practice, and his wife Carolyn Tompkins were targeted by anti-abortion activists.
- Defendants, including organizations Dallas PLAN and Operation Rescue, initiated a campaign called 'Operation John the Baptist' after Dr. Tompkins refused to sign a pledge to stop performing abortions.
- For approximately ten months, defendants picketed daily at the Tompkins' home, Dr. Tompkins' office, Mrs. Tompkins' workplace, and their church, often holding signs with graphic images and calling Dr. Tompkins a 'murderer'.
- Defendants published the Tompkins' home address and telephone number, leading to hundreds of harassing letters and phone calls, including anonymous death threats.
- Several defendants conducted near-constant surveillance of the Tompkins' home, using cars, binoculars, and cameras.
- Defendants frequently followed the Tompkins' cars when they left their home, which on one occasion resulted in a high-speed chase requiring police intervention.
- Defendant Oldrieh Tomanek trespassed on the Tompkins' property, disturbed their Thanksgiving dinner, and on two separate occasions aggressively confronted and threatened Mrs. Tompkins in her driveway.
Procedural Posture:
- Norman and Carolyn Tompkins sued the defendants in Texas state court for claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy.
- The state court issued a preliminary injunction that limited the frequency, duration, and location of the defendants' picketing activities.
- Plaintiffs later amended their state court pleadings to allege a claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
- Following the addition of the federal RICO claim, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a partial verdict finding several defendants liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy, awarding over $8 million in actual and exemplary damages.
- The jury found in favor of all defendants on one tortious interference claim and was deadlocked on the RICO claim and another tortious interference claim.
- Defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, while Plaintiffs filed motions for judgment on the verdict and for a permanent injunction, bringing the matter before the Magistrate Judge for a ruling.
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Issue:
Does imposing tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy on anti-abortion protestors for conduct including focused picketing at a private residence, surveillance, and harassment violate their First Amendment rights to free speech?
Opinions:
Majority - Kaplan, United States Magistrate Judge
No. The imposition of tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy does not violate the First Amendment because it is based on unprotected conduct, not the content of speech, and serves as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. The law distinguishes between protected expression and unprotected conduct; harassing, intrusive, and intimidating tactics like stalking, trespassing, and making threats are not constitutionally protected. For conduct that is expressive, such as picketing, the application of tort law functions as a content-neutral regulation because liability is based on the outrageous form of the communication, not its message. This regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest in protecting residential privacy and tranquility, particularly when limited to harms caused by 'focused picketing' directed at a specific residence, which the Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz held is inherently intrusive and offensive. Finally, ample alternative channels of communication remained available to the defendants, such as general neighborhood marches and distributing leaflets, ensuring the regulation did not foreclose their ability to convey their message.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between constitutionally protected protest and tortious, unprotected harassment, particularly in the context of residential privacy. By applying the First Amendment's time, place, and manner test to common law torts, the court establishes that civil liability can serve as a permissible regulation of expressive conduct. The ruling reinforces the precedent set by Frisby v. Schultz, affirming that the home receives heightened protection from intrusive protest activities like 'focused picketing.' This provides a significant legal tool for individuals targeted by aggressive protest campaigns, allowing them to seek damages for conduct that crosses from public discourse into personal intimidation and invasion of privacy.
