Tollett v. Henderson
411 U.S. 258 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea upon the advice of counsel, they may not later seek federal habeas corpus relief by raising independent claims of pre-plea constitutional violations, such as a racially discriminatory grand jury. The defendant may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that counsel's advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Facts:
- In 1948, respondent Henderson, a Black man, was arrested in Davidson County, Tennessee for robbery and attempted murder.
- The victim of the shooting died three weeks later, and Henderson was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder.
- Henderson, who was 20 years old with a sixth-grade education, signed a confession without an attorney present.
- His mother retained counsel for him, whose primary effort was to arrange a plea bargain to avoid the death penalty.
- On the advice of his counsel, Henderson pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to 99 years in prison.
- At the time of his indictment and plea, Black people were systematically excluded from grand jury service in Davidson County.
- Neither Henderson nor his attorney was aware of the unconstitutional grand jury selection process at the time the guilty plea was entered.
Procedural Posture:
- Henderson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in a Tennessee state trial court in 1948.
- Years later, Henderson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court, which was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- Henderson then filed a state habeas corpus petition, raising for the first time the claim of racial discrimination in the grand jury.
- The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, held that he had waived this claim by pleading guilty.
- Henderson then filed the current federal habeas corpus petition in U.S. District Court, again asserting the grand jury discrimination claim.
- The District Court granted the writ of habeas corpus, ordering Henderson's release.
- Petitioner Tollett, the warden, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a state prisoner's guilty plea, entered on the advice of competent counsel, foreclose a subsequent federal habeas corpus claim that the indictment was returned by a grand jury from which members of his race were systematically excluded?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, a guilty plea forecloses a subsequent federal habeas corpus claim based on pre-plea constitutional violations like grand jury discrimination. A guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events in the criminal process, and after a defendant solemnly admits guilt in open court, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to constitutional deprivations that occurred prior to the plea's entry. Citing the 'Brady trilogy' (Brady, McMann, Parker), the Court reasoned that the focus of a federal habeas inquiry is not the pre-plea constitutional infirmity itself, but the nature of the legal advice and the voluntariness of the plea. To obtain relief, the defendant must demonstrate that the advice he received from counsel was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,' as established in McMann v. Richardson. Therefore, Henderson is not entitled to release solely because the grand jury was unconstitutionally selected; he must instead challenge the competence of the advice that led to his plea.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No, a guilty plea should not foreclose a claim where neither the defendant nor his attorney knew of the underlying constitutional violation, as a waiver must be knowing and intelligent. The majority misapplies the 'Brady trilogy,' which was premised on a 'bargain and exchange' where a defendant knowingly relinquishes a constitutional challenge for a more lenient sentence. Henderson could not have bargained away a right he was unaware of. The dissent argues that his counsel's failure to investigate or even consider the well-established law regarding grand jury discrimination, especially given how easy it would have been to discover the facts, rendered his assistance incompetent. A plea cannot be intelligent if the defendant is not informed of his available options and constitutional protections, and the attorney's duty is to consult with the client on such fundamental matters.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the finality of guilty pleas and limits the scope of federal habeas corpus review for state prisoners. It solidifies the 'guilty plea waiver' doctrine, establishing that a plea effectively insulates the conviction from collateral attacks based on pre-plea constitutional errors, even those unknown to the defendant at the time. The ruling shifts the legal battleground for such defendants from the merits of the original constitutional violation (e.g., grand jury discrimination) to the competency of their counsel's performance under the McMann standard. This makes it substantially more difficult for prisoners who pleaded guilty to overturn their convictions, as they must now prove their own lawyer was constitutionally ineffective rather than just proving the state violated their rights.
