Tobey v. County of Bristol
23 F. Cas. 1313, 3 Story 800 (1845)
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Rule of Law:
A court of equity will not grant specific performance to compel a party to submit a dispute to arbitration. Such agreements are revocable at common law by either party at any time before an award is rendered.
Facts:
- Jonathan Tobey had claims against the County of Bristol arising from the construction of a road, for which he had no existing legal remedy.
- On March 30, 1839, the Massachusetts legislature passed a resolve authorizing the County Commissioners to either examine Tobey's claims or refer them to mutually selected arbitrators.
- The resolve stated that the decision of the commissioners or the arbitrators would be final.
- Tobey petitioned the County Commissioners to refer all his claims to arbitration, and the commissioners made a docket entry stating "Granted."
- Subsequently, the commissioners issued an order agreeing to refer only a portion of Tobey's claims, excepting those related to prior lawsuits.
- Tobey refused to proceed with this limited arbitration and insisted that all claims be referred as per the initial agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Jonathan Tobey brought a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- The suit sought to compel the County Commissioners of Bristol, by injunction or otherwise, to agree to the mutual selection of arbitrators to resolve all of Tobey's claims against the county.
- The case was presented to the Circuit Court for a decision on whether it possessed the authority to grant the requested relief.
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Issue:
Does a court of equity possess the jurisdiction to compel specific performance of an agreement to refer a claim to arbitration?
Opinions:
Majority - Story, Circuit Justice
No, a court of equity does not possess the jurisdiction to compel specific performance of an agreement to refer a claim to arbitration. Historically, courts of equity have consistently refused to entertain bills seeking to enforce such agreements. The court's refusal is based on two primary grounds. First, equity will not compel a party to submit their rights to a tribunal, such as arbitration, which lacks the full procedural powers of a court to administer justice, such as compelling witness testimony or discovery. Second, it is practically impossible for a court to enforce such an agreement, as it cannot compel parties to mutually agree on arbitrators, dictate the number of arbitrators, or substitute its own judgment for that of the chosen arbitrators without rewriting the parties' agreement. Furthermore, at common law, an agreement to arbitrate is considered revocable by either party at any point before an award is made, and equity follows the law by not enforcing an agreement that is inherently countermandable.
Analysis:
This case establishes the foundational common law principle in American jurisprudence that executory agreements to arbitrate are not subject to specific performance. Justice Story's reasoning highlights the traditional judicial view of arbitration as an inadequate and subordinate alternative to the court system, and reflects equity's reluctance to issue orders that are impractical to enforce. While modern statutes like the Federal Arbitration Act have largely superseded this common law rule by making arbitration agreements specifically enforceable, this opinion remains a landmark explanation of the legal landscape prior to such legislation and the historical judicial skepticism towards ousting courts of their jurisdiction.
