Tippett v. United States
Not provided in text (1997)
Rule of Law:
The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) shields the United States from liability when a government employee's actions involve an element of choice, and that choice is grounded in policy considerations such as balancing public access, safety, and wildlife conservation, even if the discretion is negligently exercised.
Facts:
- In February 1993, Frank Tippett and Judy Rand were participants in a guided snowmobile tour exploring parts of Yellowstone National Park.
- As their group entered the park through the south gate and began traveling toward Old Faithful, they encountered a moose standing in the road.
- A group of snowmobilers ahead of Tippett and Rand's group attempted to pass the moose, and the animal charged one snowmobile, knocking two passengers to the ground.
- Later that day, as Tippett and Rand's group was departing the park, they again approached the moose, and Ranger Dave Phillips directed them to pass the moose on the right.
- As Mr. Tippett attempted to go around the moose as directed, the animal charged his vehicle, kicked its windscreen, struck him in the helmet, and knocked him off the snowmobile.
- Mr. Tippett suffered a broken neck from the encounter, and the moose broke one of its legs and had to be destroyed.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Tippett and Judy Rand filed negligence and loss of consortium claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.
- The United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
- The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, finding them barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
- Because the district court considered matters outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
- Plaintiffs Frank Tippett and Judy Rand appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act bar claims against the United States when a park ranger's actions in managing a wildlife encounter, which resulted in injury, involved judgment grounded in general park policies balancing wildlife conservation and public access, rather than a specific mandatory directive?
Opinions:
Majority - Briscoe, Circuit Judge
Yes, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act bars claims against the United States when a park ranger's actions in managing a wildlife encounter involved judgment grounded in general park policies balancing wildlife conservation and public access. The court applied the two-prong test from Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States to determine the applicability of the discretionary function exception. First, it found that Ranger Phillips' actions involved an element of choice. While plaintiffs pointed to a general park safety policy prioritizing human life, the court deemed this directive too general to remove discretion, citing precedent such as Varig Airlines (general statutory duty to promote safety not sufficient) and Daigle (health and safety goals not specific enough). Thus, no 'specific and mandatory statute, regulation or policy' dictated Ranger Phillips' exact course of action. Second, the court determined that Ranger Phillips' judgment was of the kind the exception was designed to shield, as it involved fundamental policy considerations. National Park Service policy (16 U.S.C. § 1) explicitly mandates balancing wildlife conservation with public access. Regulations like the Ranger Operating Procedure concerning temporary closures, which allow a choice among 'an unlimited number of actions' to resolve situations, and the Natural Resources Management Guideline for stranded animals, both require discretionary judgment to implement. The existence of these regulations, which allow for discretion, created a 'strong presumption' (per Gaubert v. United States) that Ranger Phillips' actions were driven by the same policy concerns. The court distinguished Boyd v. United States ex rel. United States Army, Corps of Eng’rs, where a failure to warn was not connected to the policy creating the hazard, by noting that Ranger Phillips' actions were directly tied to the policy of balancing wildlife preservation and public access. The court also reiterated that the exception applies even if discretion is exercised negligently, as held in Domme v. United States, emphasizing that the focus is on whether the action was grounded in public policy.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad application of the discretionary function exception, particularly in the context of governmental management of public lands and natural resources. It clarifies that general safety directives, even those with broad goals like preserving human life, are usually insufficient to negate a government employee's discretion when balancing competing policy objectives. The decision highlights the difficulty of suing the government for injuries arising from actions that involve policy-based judgments, even if those judgments are exercised negligently, as long as they are linked to a legitimate governmental policy. This broad interpretation makes it challenging for individuals to seek redress for harms caused by discretionary actions of federal employees when those actions are rooted in policy mandates such as balancing conservation with public access.
