Timberlake v. Heflin
379 S.E.2d 149, 180 W. Va. 644 (1989)
Rule of Law:
A signed and verified judicial pleading, such as a divorce complaint, that acknowledges an oral agreement to convey real property can serve as a sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds.
Facts:
- Richard L. Timberlake and Sherry L. Timberlake were married in 1976 and purchased a home in 1977 as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
- Sometime prior to July 1983, while contemplating divorce, they entered into an oral contract to divide their marital assets.
- Under the oral agreement, Richard Timberlake was to transfer his interest in a jointly owned automobile and motorcycle to Sherry Timberlake.
- In exchange, Sherry Timberlake agreed to convey her interest in their jointly owned marital home to Richard Timberlake.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 22, 1983, Sherry L. Heflin (formerly Timberlake) filed a suit for divorce against Richard L. Timberlake in the Berkeley County Circuit Court.
- The final divorce order, entered on August 31, 1984, did not make any disposition of the marital home.
- Richard L. Timberlake later filed a separate suit in the Berkeley County Circuit Court for specific performance of the oral contract to compel Ms. Heflin to transfer her interest in the home.
- Mr. and Ms. Heflin filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute of frauds barred the enforcement of the oral contract.
- The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding the averments in the divorce complaint were not sufficient to overcome the statute of frauds.
- Roxanne Timberlake, as executor of the estate of Richard L. Timberlake (who died during the appeal), appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a statement in a signed and verified divorce complaint, which acknowledges an agreement to convey an interest in real property, constitute a sufficient 'note or memorandum' to satisfy the statute of frauds for an oral contract for the sale of land?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Miller
Yes. A judicial pleading can constitute a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds. The statute's purpose is to prevent fraud regarding unmade contracts, not to bar the enforcement of contracts that were in fact made and later admitted in a sworn court document. The divorce complaint filed by Ms. Heflin was a writing signed by her, the party to be charged. It contained a reasonably certain description of the property and stated her agreement to convey her interest, thus satisfying the essential requirements for a memorandum under W.Va.Code, 36-1-3. Because a sufficient memorandum exists, the oral contract is removed from the procedural bar of the statute of frauds and can be enforced.
Analysis:
This decision formally recognizes a 'judicial admission' exception to the statute of frauds in West Virginia, aligning the state with a modern trend. By holding that a statement in a sworn pleading can satisfy the writing requirement, the court prevents parties from using the statute as a tool to escape contracts they have already acknowledged under oath in a legal proceeding. This ruling reinforces the equitable principle that the statute of frauds is intended to prevent fraud, not to facilitate it by allowing a party to disavow a previously admitted agreement. The decision clarifies that the form of the memorandum is flexible, prioritizing the substance of the admission over the document's original purpose.
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