Thunder Hawk Ex Rel. Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad

Majority - Macy, Justice

No, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its procedural and evidentiary rulings, nor was the jury's verdict unsupported by the evidence, and therefore no reversible error occurred. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court reasoned that a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket, including the timing of pretrial motion hearings (W.R.C.P. 16(d)). Appellants failed to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by the district court's decision to hear motions just before trial, and many of their motions lacked cogent argument (W.R.A.P. 7.01(f)). Motions concerning expert witnesses who did not testify were deemed moot. The decision to deny Appellants' request to call a designated Union Pacific witness as their own was within the court's discretion over witness presentation (W.R.E. 611(a)), especially since Appellants did not show clear harm or fully utilize cross-examination. Regarding expert testimony, the district court properly limited one expert's testimony because it exceeded the scope of his expert witness designation, a matter within the trial court's discretion to interpret its own orders. The exclusion of another expert's testimony regarding Federal Railway Administration (FRA) accident statistics was also proper because Appellants failed to lay a proper foundation, not showing that the statistics were of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field or sufficiently trustworthy (W.R.E. 703). Concerning depositions, the district court correctly excluded portions of Robert Charging Hawk's deposition mentioning another child on a locomotive with an adult, as it was irrelevant to the attractive nuisance doctrine (§ 339), which applies only to child trespassers. Similarly, comments made by Jeremy Charging Hawk's mother during his deposition were properly excluded as mostly irrelevant (W.R.E. 401) or having probative value outweighed by unfair prejudice (W.R.E. 403), given she was not under oath. Union Pacific's use of portions of Alex's own deposition was permissible as admissions by a party-opponent (W.R.C.P. 32(a)(1), W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A)). Any errors related to the damages portion of the trial were harmless, as the jury found that Union Pacific did not owe a duty of reasonable care under § 339, rendering damage findings immaterial (W.R.C.P. 61, W.R.A.P. 9.04). The district court properly refused certain jury instructions. An instruction based on Wyo.Stat. § 37-9-1101 was inapplicable because the statute explicitly exempts attractive nuisance cases. A willful and wanton misconduct instruction was correctly refused due to insufficient supporting evidence presented at trial. Appellants' objections to the verdict form were either resolved through modification they accepted or waived by not being raised at trial, such as the claim about Alex's learning disability or inconsistencies in the verdict. Finally, the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. The Court, reviewing under a standard that assumes evidence in favor of the successful party is true, found that the jury reasonably concluded Union Pacific did not know children were likely to trespass where Alex was injured, nor did it realize the trains posed an unreasonable risk to trespassing children (given no similar injuries in 16 years). The jury's finding against Appellants on the utility/burden comparison (element 'd' of § 339) was also supported.