Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham
393 U.S. 268 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
An appellate court must apply the administrative regulations in effect at the time it renders its decision, especially when the new regulation clarifies procedural rights and its application does not result in manifest injustice or the impairment of a vested right.
Facts:
- On November 11, 1964, Joyce C. Thorpe and her children began a month-to-month tenancy at McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted housing project operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham.
- The lease provided that either the tenant or the Housing Authority could terminate the tenancy with 15 days' notice before the end of a monthly term.
- On August 10, 1965, Thorpe was elected president of a tenants' organization within the housing project.
- The very next day, August 11, 1965, the Housing Authority notified Thorpe that her lease would be terminated at the end of the month, providing no reason for the decision.
- Thorpe's attorneys attempted to learn the reason for the eviction, but the Housing Authority did not respond to their inquiries.
- Thorpe refused to vacate her apartment following the termination notice.
- While the case was pending, on February 7, 1967, HUD issued a circular requiring local housing authorities to inform tenants of the reasons for eviction and give them an opportunity to reply.
Procedural Posture:
- The Housing Authority brought a summary eviction action against Thorpe in the Durham Justice of the Peace Court.
- The Justice of the Peace Court ordered Thorpe's eviction.
- Thorpe appealed to the Superior Court of Durham County, which affirmed the eviction after a trial de novo.
- Thorpe then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which also affirmed, holding that the Authority's reasons for eviction were immaterial under the lease.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- Following HUD's issuance of the February 7, 1967 circular, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the state court judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the circular.
- On remand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reaffirmed its earlier decision, holding that the new circular did not apply retroactively.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time.
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Issue:
Must a federally assisted public housing authority apply a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) circular, which requires notice of reasons for eviction, to an eviction proceeding that was initiated before the circular was issued but where the tenant is still in residence?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
Yes, the HUD circular must be applied to eviction proceedings that were initiated before the circular was issued if the tenant is still residing in the project. The general rule is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. First, the HUD circular was a mandatory requirement, not merely advisory, as evidenced by its language, its incorporation into the Low-Rent Management Manual, and HUD's own administrative interpretation, to which the Court gives controlling weight. Second, the circular is a valid exercise of HUD's rule-making authority under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as it is reasonably related to the statutory purpose of providing decent housing and does not unconstitutionally impair any contract rights. Third, applying the circular to Thorpe's pending case follows the established principle that courts should apply current law. This application does not create a 'manifest injustice' to the Housing Authority; rather, it provides an essential procedural safeguard that helps tenants defend against potentially unconstitutional evictions.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. The Court's extensive analysis is unnecessary because the case is simple. The Housing Authority has stated it is already complying with the HUD circular for all other tenants. The only issue is whether it should apply to Thorpe, whose eviction proceeding started before the circular but who remains in her home due to court stays. The circular should obviously apply to her, and nothing more needs to be decided.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that appellate courts must apply the law, including administrative regulations, as it exists at the time of their decision, a rule originating from United States v. Schooner Peggy. It strengthened procedural protections for recipients of government benefits by establishing that tenants in federally funded public housing have a right to be informed of the reasons for their eviction. The ruling avoided the larger constitutional due process question but provided a significant, statutorily-based victory for tenants' rights, paving the way for future due process litigation in the context of government benefits. It also reinforces the administrative law doctrine of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.
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