Thomson v. Larson
147 F.3d 195 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
To qualify as a co-author of a "joint work" under the Copyright Act, a contributor must not only make an independently copyrightable contribution but must also demonstrate that each putative author intended to be regarded as a co-author.
Facts:
- Jonathan Larson began creating the musical Rent and, after an early collaborator, Billy Aronson, stepped away, Larson obtained permission to develop it on his own, with Aronson explicitly not being considered a co-author.
- The New York Theatre Workshop (NYTW) repeatedly suggested Larson hire a bookwriter, but Larson 'absolutely, vehemently and totally' refused, insisting on being the sole author of Rent.
- In May 1995, Larson agreed to NYTW hiring Lynn Thomson as a dramaturg; her contract was with NYTW for a $2,000 fee and credit as 'Dramaturg,' with no mention of authorship or copyright.
- Thomson worked intensively with Larson during the summer and fall of 1995, contributing to the script's structure, themes, and language.
- Larson retained complete control over the work, personally entering all changes into his computer and having the final say on all creative decisions.
- In November 1995, Larson signed an agreement with NYTW that identified him as the sole 'Author' of Rent, granted him approval rights over all changes, and stated that any changes would become his property.
- All drafts of the script, playbills, and related documents consistently credited the work as 'Rent, by Jonathan Larson.'
- After Larson's sudden death in January 1996 and the subsequent success of Rent, Thomson approached Larson's heirs to request a percentage of the author's royalties.
Procedural Posture:
- Lynn Thomson filed a lawsuit against the heirs of Jonathan Larson in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- Thomson sought a declaratory judgment establishing her as a co-author of the musical Rent and requested 16% of the author's royalties.
- Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the Larson Heirs, concluding that Thomson was not a joint author and dismissed her complaint.
- Thomson (appellant) appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the Larson Heirs as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a contributor to a dramatic work qualify as a co-author of a 'joint work' under the Copyright Act when the principal author never expressed or demonstrated an intent to share authorship, even if the contributor's contributions were independently copyrightable?
Opinions:
Majority - Calabresi, Circuit Judge
No. A contributor does not qualify as a co-author without a mutual intent between the parties to be co-authors, regardless of the copyrightability of their contribution. The court applied the two-pronged test from Childress v. Taylor, which requires both (1) an independently copyrightable contribution and (2) that the parties 'fully intended to be co-authors.' Assuming Thomson met the first prong, the court found overwhelming evidence that Larson lacked the requisite intent to make her a co-author. Objective evidence, which is paramount in this inquiry, demonstrated Larson's intent to be the sole author. This evidence included his repeated rejection of a collaborator, his contractual agreements identifying himself as the sole author, his complete control over the work's content, and the consistent 'sole author' billing he received. The court concluded that a contributor's significant creative input does not, by itself, create a joint work; mutual intent is a mandatory and independent requirement.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the high bar for claiming joint authorship status under U.S. copyright law, reaffirming the 'mutual intent' requirement from Childress v. Taylor. It clarifies that even a substantial, copyrightable contribution is insufficient if the dominant author did not view the contributor as a co-author. The ruling serves as a strong protection for sole creators against later claims of co-ownership from collaborators, editors, or other assistants. Consequently, it heavily underscores the necessity for collaborators in creative fields to define their ownership rights and status explicitly through written contracts before or during the creative process, as courts will look to objective evidence of intent rather than the magnitude of contribution alone.
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