Thomson v. Cash
402 A.2d 651, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1234, 119 N.H. 371 (1979)
Rule of Law:
When words alleged to be defamatory are susceptible of more than one meaning, including a defamatory one, their interpretation is a question of fact for the jury, and a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is improper if genuine issues of fact exist regarding falsity and actual malice, particularly when the plaintiff is a public official.
Facts:
- Frank Cash authored a book titled 'Who the Hell is William Loeb?', which was published by Amoskeag Press, Inc. in December 1975.
- The book contained a paragraph concerning Meldrim Thomson, Jr., stating he 'left, migrated to Orford and started Equity Publishing Co., taking with him certain accounts of the Brooklyn firm, including the printing of statutes for some Spanish-speaking countries.'
- Meldrim Thomson, Jr. brought a libel action, alleging this paragraph, particularly the phrase 'taking with him certain accounts of the Brooklyn firm,' was defamatory and injured his reputation.
- Meldrim Thomson, Jr. was the Governor of New Hampshire from January 1973 through December 1978, covering the publication date of the book.
- Thomson was not actively engaged in the law book publishing business from the time he became Governor in January 1973 through all relevant times to the action.
Procedural Posture:
- Meldrim Thomson, Jr. initiated a libel action for damages against Frank Cash and Amoskeag Press, Inc. in a trial court.
- Defendants (Cash and Amoskeag Press, Inc.) filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action in libel.
- Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit from defendant Cash and other discovery products, including depositions.
- The trial court (Flynn, J.) heard arguments and denied both the defendants' motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact existed for the trier of fact.
- Defendants filed exceptions to the trial court's denial of their motions, bringing the matter before the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a trial court err in denying motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in a libel action if the published words are reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, and genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the truth of the statements and whether the defendants acted with actual malice, even if the plaintiff is a public official?
Opinions:
Majority - Brock J.
No, a trial court does not err in denying motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in a libel action when words are reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning and genuine issues of material fact remain concerning the truth of the statements and the presence of actual malice, even if the plaintiff is a public official. The court first addresses the motion to dismiss, holding that for a statement to be actionable as libel, it must tend to lower the plaintiff in the esteem of a substantial and respectable group, and the defamatory meaning must be one ascribed by 'hearers of common and reasonable understanding.' The court found that the words 'taking with him certain accounts' are susceptible to more than one meaning and that readers of ordinary intelligence could reasonably understand them as implying fraud or wrongdoing. Therefore, whether the words were used in a defamatory sense is a question of fact for the jury, precluding dismissal. Regarding the motion for summary judgment, the court considered several claims by the defendants. First, while acknowledging that the plaintiff, as a public official, could not base his action on injury to his profession as a law book publisher (since he was not actively engaged in that business while Governor), he could still allege general damages for injury to his personal reputation. The determination of whether injury and damages occurred is a question for the jury. Second, the court affirmed that Meldrim Thomson, Jr. was a 'public official' under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, requiring him to prove falsity and 'actual malice' (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) with clear and convincing evidence. However, the court found that, based on the affidavits and depositions, genuine issues of fact existed regarding the truth or falsity of the statement and whether the defendants acted with actual malice. The subjective nature of actual malice makes it difficult to prove or disprove at the summary judgment stage, as it often must be inferred from circumstances. Therefore, the trial court properly denied summary judgment, leaving these issues for the trier of fact.
Analysis:
This case highlights the enduring difficulty of resolving libel claims, particularly those involving public officials, at early stages of litigation like motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. It reinforces the principle that if a statement is ambiguous and reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation, a jury must determine its meaning. Furthermore, it reiterates the high bar for public officials to prove 'actual malice' and emphasizes that this subjective state of mind, often requiring inferences, makes summary judgment generally inappropriate when sufficient evidence raises a genuine issue of fact regarding the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard for truth.
