Thompson v. Utah
18 S. Ct. 620, 170 U.S. 343, 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1550 (1898)
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Rule of Law:
A law that retroactively reduces the size of a jury for a felony trial from twelve to eight persons is an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it deprives the accused of a substantial right that was in place at the time of the offense.
Facts:
- On March 2, 1895, Thompson was accused of stealing a calf belonging to Heber Wilson in Wayne County, Utah Territory.
- At the time the crime was allegedly committed, Utah was a U.S. Territory, not a state.
- The governing law in the Utah Territory required a trial jury of twelve persons for a felony, such as the grand larceny charge Thompson faced.
- After the alleged crime but before Thompson's second trial, Utah was admitted into the Union as a state.
- The new Constitution of the State of Utah provided that juries for non-capital felony cases would consist of eight jurors.
Procedural Posture:
- Thompson was indicted for grand larceny in the District Court for the Territory of Utah.
- He was first tried by a jury of twelve persons and found guilty.
- The trial court granted Thompson's motion for a new trial.
- Before the second trial, Utah became a state.
- Thompson was tried a second time in a state court by a jury of eight persons and was again found guilty.
- Thompson moved for a new trial, arguing the eight-person jury was unconstitutional; the trial court overruled the motion and sentenced him to three years in prison.
- Thompson appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah (the state's highest court).
- The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial by an eight-person jury was constitutional.
- Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a provision in a new state constitution that allows for an eight-person jury in a non-capital felony trial violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution when applied to a defendant who committed the felony before the state was admitted to the Union, at a time when the governing law required a twelve-person jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes. The provision in the Utah constitution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to Thompson's case. The right to a trial by a jury of twelve, as it existed at common law, is a substantial constitutional protection that applied in the Utah Territory at the time the offense was committed. A subsequent law that reduces the number of jurors from twelve to eight alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage by making a conviction easier to obtain and thereby deprives him of a substantial right. Such a change is not merely procedural but is a substantive alteration of the legal protections afforded to the accused, and its retroactive application is forbidden by the Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham
No opinion was published.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the number of jurors in a felony trial is a substantive, fundamental right rather than a mere procedural rule. By classifying the change in jury size as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court limited the ability of legislatures to alter the core mechanics of a criminal trial retroactively. The ruling reinforces the principle that constitutional protections, as understood at common law, cannot be diminished for past offenses, even under the guise of procedural reform. This case is significant for its firm distinction between permissible retroactive procedural changes and impermissible changes that affect substantial rights and protections of a criminal defendant.
