Thompson v. United States
145 S. Ct. 821, 604 U.S. 408 (2025)
Rule of Law:
The federal statute 18 U.S.C. §1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" to influence the FDIC, criminalizes only statements that are actually false (not true) and does not extend to statements that are merely misleading but technically true.
Facts:
- Between 2011 and 2014, Patrick Thompson obtained three separate loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings totaling $219,000 in principal.
- Following the bank's failure in 2017, the FDIC assumed responsibility for collecting the outstanding loans.
- In February 2018, the FDIC's loan servicer sent Thompson an invoice showing a balance of approximately $269,000, reflecting the principal plus interest.
- Thompson called the loan servicer and disputed the invoice, stating he had "no idea where the 269 number comes from" and asserting, "I borrowed . . . $110,000."
- During a subsequent call with FDIC contractors, Thompson repeated the claim that he had borrowed $110,000.
- While it was factually true that Thompson had borrowed $110,000 in his first loan, he omitted the fact that he had subsequently borrowed additional funds that raised his total debt to $219,000.
Procedural Posture:
- The government indicted Thompson in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for violating 18 U.S.C. §1014.
- A jury found Thompson guilty on two counts of making false statements.
- Thompson filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing his statements were literally true and therefore not false under the statute.
- The District Court denied the motion, ruling that literal falsity is not required to sustain a §1014 conviction.
- Thompson appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that §1014 criminalizes misleading representations even if they are literally true.
- Thompson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. §1014, which prohibits knowingly making a "false statement" to the FDIC, criminalize statements that are misleading but literally true?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No, the statute's prohibition on "false" statements applies only to statements that are "not true" and does not encompass statements that are merely misleading. The Court reasoned that "false" and "misleading" are distinct concepts; a misleading statement can be technically true, and a true statement cannot be false. A textual analysis reveals that while Congress frequently uses the phrase "false or misleading" in other statutes within Title 18, it chose to use only the word "false" in §1014. The Court rejected the Government's argument that "false" includes "deceitful" or "misleading" by noting that the expansive modifier "any" (as in "any false statement") does not transform the definition of the noun it modifies. The Court cited United States v. Williams to support the proposition that a conviction requires a statement to be characterizable as "false" rather than "true." Consequently, a statement that is misleading but true does not violate the statute.
Concurring - Justice Alito
Yes, the statute requires falsity, but determining whether a statement is "false" requires analyzing the context in which it was made. Justice Alito emphasized that ordinary speech relies on context to determine truth; for example, saying "I ate three cookies" when one actually ate twelve is literally true in isolation but false in context because it implies a limit. He noted that while "false" and "misleading" overlap, jury instructions should avoid the term "misleading" to prevent confusion. He agreed with the remand to determine if a rational jury could find Thompson's statements false when viewed in context.
Concurring - Justice Jackson
Yes, the statute criminalizes only false statements, but the jury in this case was likely properly instructed on that exact standard. Justice Jackson noted that the District Court's instructions required the jury to find that Thompson made the "charged false statement" and did not explicitly instruct them that a misleading statement was sufficient for guilt. She suggested that on remand, the Court of Appeals would likely need to affirm the conviction because the jury had already found the statements to be false.
Analysis:
This decision represents a strict textualist approach to criminal statutory interpretation, reinforcing the principle that courts cannot expand criminal liability beyond the plain meaning of the words chosen by Congress. By distinguishing between "false" and "misleading," the Court forces prosecutors to prove actual untruth rather than mere deception or omission, unless the statute explicitly forbids misleading conduct. This ruling aligns with the rule of lenity concepts, ensuring defendants have clear notice of prohibited conduct. Practically, this means that "half-truths" or literally true but deceptive statements made to financial institutions under §1014 may not be federal crimes unless the context renders them factually false.
