Thompson v. Thompson
31 S. Ct. 111, 1910 U.S. LEXIS 2055, 218 U.S. 611 (1910)
Rule of Law:
Absent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to abrogate a long-standing common law doctrine, statutes granting married women the ability to sue separately for torts committed against them do not create a cause of action for a wife against her husband for personal torts.
Facts:
- Mrs. Thompson was married to Mr. Thompson.
- Mr. Thompson committed multiple assaults and batteries upon Mrs. Thompson's person.
- Mrs. Thompson sought to recover monetary damages for the injuries she sustained from these assaults.
- Some of the assaults by Mr. Thompson occurred while Mrs. Thompson was pregnant, a fact he was aware of.
Procedural Posture:
- Mrs. Thompson (plaintiff) filed a declaration (complaint) for damages against Mr. Thompson (defendant) in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (trial court), alleging multiple assaults and batteries.
- Mr. Thompson filed pleas, including one asserting that he and Mrs. Thompson were husband and wife at the time of the alleged actions.
- Mrs. Thompson demurred to Mr. Thompson's plea, challenging its legal sufficiency.
- The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia overruled Mrs. Thompson's demurrer, holding that such an action (a wife suing her husband for personal torts) would not lie under the relevant statute.
- Mrs. Thompson appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
- Mrs. Thompson sought review by writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Section 1155 of the District of Columbia Code, which allows married women to sue separately for torts committed against them 'as fully and freely as if they were unmarried,' permit a wife to bring an action to recover damages for assault and battery against her husband?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Day
No, Section 1155 of the District of Columbia Code does not permit a wife to bring an action to recover damages for assault and battery against her husband. The Court reasoned that at common law, husband and wife were considered one legal entity, and thus, they could not sue each other for torts. While many states, including the District of Columbia, have passed statutes to emancipate married women from common law disabilities—allowing them to control property and sue separately for torts—these statutes generally aimed to remove the requirement for the husband to join in her lawsuits against third parties, not to create new causes of action against the husband himself. The Court emphasized that for such a radical change to the common law unity doctrine to occur, the legislative intent must be expressed in language 'so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence' of that purpose. The D.C. Code's language, which allowed wives to sue 'as fully and freely as if they were unmarried,' simply removed the procedural bar of requiring the husband to be joined, but did not signify a legislative intent to permit interspousal personal tort suits. The Court also noted that allowing such suits could undermine domestic harmony and public welfare, issues best left for the legislature to address, and that wives had other remedies for grievous wrongs, such as criminal prosecution or divorce proceedings.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
Yes, Section 1155 of the District of Columbia Code clearly permits a wife to bring an action for assault and battery against her husband. Justice Harlan argued that the plain and explicit language of the statute should be upheld. Section 1155 states that married women may 'sue separately...for torts committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried.' He contended that this language makes no discrimination or exception for the husband, thereby destroying the common law unity of the marriage association. He asserted that the court's role is to declare what the law is, as established by the legislature, not to make policy judgments about the wisdom or potential consequences of the legislation. Justice Harlan found it anomalous that the majority's construction would allow a wife to sue her husband for torts against her property but deny her the right to sue him for brutal assaults against her person, when both are 'torts committed against her' under the statute.
Analysis:
This case solidified the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity for personal torts in many U.S. jurisdictions for decades. It demonstrated a judicial reluctance to interpret married women's enabling acts as fundamentally altering the marital relationship, particularly concerning personal injury claims between spouses, without explicit legislative direction. The Court's emphasis on clear legislative intent for abrogating long-standing common law principles became a significant canon of statutory construction. While subsequent legislation and judicial decisions have largely abrogated interspousal immunity in most states, this case remains a landmark example of how courts historically balanced statutory interpretation with traditional legal doctrines and societal views on marriage.
