Thompson v. Thompson, AKA Clay
484 U.S. 174 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) does not create an implied private cause of action in federal court to resolve a conflict between two conflicting state custody decrees.
Facts:
- David Thompson and Susan Clay were married and had a son, Matthew.
- In July 1978, Clay filed for divorce in a California court, seeking custody of Matthew.
- The California court initially awarded the parents joint custody.
- When Clay decided to move to Louisiana for a job, the California court entered a temporary order granting her sole custody until a full custody investigation was completed.
- Clay and Matthew moved to Louisiana in December 1980.
- In April 1981, a Louisiana state court enforced the California order and awarded sole custody of Matthew to Clay.
- Two months later, the California court, having completed its investigation, entered a new order awarding sole custody of Matthew to Thompson, creating a direct conflict with the Louisiana court's decree.
Procedural Posture:
- David Thompson filed a lawsuit against Susan Clay in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking to declare the Louisiana custody decree invalid.
- The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.
- Thompson, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal, but on the grounds that the PKPA does not create a private federal cause of action, meaning Thompson failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, furnish an implied cause of action in federal court for a parent seeking to determine which of two conflicting state custody decisions is valid?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
No. The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act does not create an implied cause of action in federal court. The Court's analysis, guided by the principles of Cort v. Ash, centers on congressional intent. The context, language, and legislative history of the PKPA all indicate that Congress did not intend to create a federal remedy. Congress's primary goal was to extend the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to child custody determinations, making it a rule of decision for state courts, not a basis for federal jurisdiction. The statute's language is directed at states, not individuals, and its placement as an addendum to the main full faith and credit statute reinforces this interpretation. Furthermore, the legislative history shows that Congress explicitly considered and rejected a proposal that would have granted federal courts jurisdiction over these disputes, choosing instead to impose the enforcement duty on state courts to avoid entangling the federal judiciary in domestic relations matters.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. While I agree with the judgment and most of the majority's opinion, I join Part I of Justice Scalia's concurrence, which criticizes the majority's analytical framework for determining implied rights of action.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. While I agree that the PKPA does not create a private right of action, the majority's reasoning is flawed. The Court should not suggest that an 'implied' congressional intent can exist without evidence that Congress actually intended to create such a right. The four-factor Cort v. Ash test has been effectively overruled and replaced by a singular focus on congressional intent. Rather than continuing to search for implied rights, the Court should adopt a categorical rule that federal private rights of action will not be implied, as the creation of such remedies is a legislative function that should not be usurped by the judiciary through interpretation of legislative history and statutory context.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the doctrine of implied private rights of action, moving away from the more flexible Cort v. Ash test toward a much stricter inquiry focused solely on demonstrable congressional intent. By refusing to infer a federal remedy, the Court strongly reinforces the principle that domestic relations are a matter of state law, keeping federal courts out of interstate custody disputes unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise. The case establishes that the PKPA functions as a directive for state courts to apply full faith and credit principles, rather than a tool for litigants to open a new front in federal court. Justice Scalia's influential concurrence advocates for abandoning the search for implied rights altogether, signaling a major jurisprudential shift toward textualism and legislative supremacy.
