No, a judge cannot just throw the case out. The court decided to update its rules for injury cases, making it a jury's job to decide if the trampoline owners should have predicted the danger. The court explained that everyone has a basic duty to be careful and not create risks for others. A judge shouldn't end a lawsuit just because an accident seems unusual. Instead, a jury should get to hear the facts and decide two things: 1) Were the owners careless for leaving the trampoline unsecured? and 2) Was a car crash the kind of accident you might worry about from that carelessness? The court believed a jury could reasonably answer 'yes' to both questions.

I agree with the result, but for a simpler reason. We don't have enough information about exactly how the trampoline was left in the yard. Because the facts are unclear, the case can't be dismissed yet. Also, we should be careful with this new rule, so people don't start suing their neighbors every time a plastic lawn chair blows away.

Yes, Kaczinski and Lockwood had to be careful because people who own things have to try not to let them block roads. The court used a new rule that says you're responsible if your actions create a risk of harm. The storm blowing the unsecured trampoline into the road created a risk for drivers. The first court was wrong to decide Kaczinski and Lockwood weren't responsible without a trial. Juries usually get to decide if someone was careless, except in special cases.

I agree with the main decision, but the rule that property owners have to secure outdoor things should be applied narrowly to this case. In some situations, it may be okay to have some unsecured items outside your home. Also, we need more facts to decide if a reasonable person would know the wind could lift the trampoline. The case should go to trial because we don't have enough information, not because the court assumes people should know wind can move trampolines.

Yes, Kaczinski and Lockwood had to be careful not to let their trampoline block the road, and they needed to remove it quickly once it did. People who own things have to try not to let them block roads. We used a new rule that says you're responsible if your actions create a risk of harm. The storm blowing the unsecured trampoline into the road created a risk for drivers. The first court was wrong to decide Kaczinski and Lockwood weren't responsible without a trial. Juries usually get to decide if someone was careless, except in special cases.

Yes, I agree with the main decision that Kaczinski and Lockwood had to be careful not to let their trampoline block the road and remove it quickly once it did, but the rule that property owners have to secure outdoor things should be applied narrowly to this case. In some situations, it may be okay to have some unsecured items outside your home. Also, we need more facts to decide if a reasonable person would know the wind could lift the trampoline. The case should go to trial because we don't have enough information, not because the court assumes people should know wind can move trampolines.

—we adopted section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.

An actionable negligence claim requires "the existence of a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others, a failure to conform to that standard, proximate cause, and damages."

Historically, we have considered three factors when determining whether a duty exists: "(1) the relationship between the parties,(2) reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person who is injured, and (3) public policy considerations."

—adopting Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 (a) that an "actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm

—adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts formulation of causation for civil cases and substituting the "scope of liability" inquiry for the former concepts of "proximate cause" and "legal cause

The scope-of-liability issue is fact-intensive as it requires consideration of the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious and a determination of whether the harm at issue is a result of any of those risks

A negligence claim requires proof of (1) the existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care,(2) breach of the duty of reasonable care,(3) factual cause and loss within the scope of liability, and (4) damages.

—reversing summary judgment for defendant and remanding for trial under scope of liability provisions of the Restatement (Third) adopted in that opinion

"It is well-settled that" questions of negligence or proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury, ``and "only in exceptional cases should they be decided as a matter of law.'"

NW 2d at 834-35, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical Harm ("Third Restatement") § 7, and removed the foreseeability analysis from duty determinations.

No, foreseeability does not determine the existence of a legal duty for the court. The court adopts the Restatement (Third) of Torts, holding that landowners have a general duty to exercise reasonable care when their conduct creates a risk of physical harm. Foreseeability is a question for the jury to consider under the elements of breach and scope of liability. The court reasoned that the prior three-factor test for duty (relationship, foreseeability, public policy) created confusion. By adopting the Restatement (Third) approach, the court clarifies that duty is a broad, pre-existing concept, and a 'no duty' ruling should be reserved for exceptional cases based on articulated public policy, not the specific facts of a case. This shifts the fact-intensive foreseeability inquiry to the jury's determination of breach. The court also adopted the Restatement (Third)'s 'scope of liability' analysis to replace the confusing 'proximate cause' doctrine, limiting a defendant's liability to harms that result from the risks that made their conduct tortious in the first place. Applying these principles, the court found Kaczinski and Lockwood owed a general duty of care, and a reasonable jury could find that the harm suffered by Thompson was within the scope of risks created by leaving a large, unsecured object near a road during a time of year when high winds can occur.

Yes, concurring in the result. The majority is correct to reverse summary judgment, but the holding should be construed narrowly to the facts of this case involving a large object like a trampoline, as it might not apply to common items like patio furniture or trash cans. The majority should not have concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find the harm foreseeable without any facts in the record about the trampoline's specific condition and placement. Summary judgment should be denied simply because the facts are unclear and undeveloped, not because the court can pre-determine what a jury might reasonably conclude.

Yes, Kaczinski and Lockwood owed a common law duty because property owners must exercise reasonable care to avoid placing obstructions on roadways. I adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which clarifies that an actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care when their conduct creates a risk of physical harm. The foreseeability of the trampoline's displacement due to wind and the failure to secure it created a risk of harm to motorists. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because a reasonable fact finder could conclude the defendants should have known the risks and the plaintiffs' injuries were within the scope of those risks. Questions of negligence or proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury, and only in exceptional cases should they be decided as a matter of law.

I concur with the result reached by the majority, but the holding that the defendants had a common-law duty to reasonably secure outdoor personal property should be narrowly construed to the facts of this case. There may be a point when public-policy considerations would intervene to narrow the duty to exclude some items of personal property placed outside a home. Also, summary judgment should be denied because the facts are unclear on how the wind could have moved the trampoline, not because of an unsupported conclusion that a reasonable person should have known wind could lift the trampoline. More facts are needed to make that determination.

Yes, Kaczinski and Lockwood owed a common law duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent their disassembled trampoline from obstructing the roadway and to remove it within a reasonable time after it became an obstruction. We adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which clarifies that an actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care when their conduct creates a risk of physical harm. The foreseeability of the trampoline's displacement due to wind and the failure to secure it created a risk of harm to motorists. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because a reasonable fact finder could conclude the defendants should have known the risks and the plaintiffs' injuries were within the scope of those risks. Questions of negligence or proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury, and only in exceptional cases should they be decided as a matter of law.

Yes, I concur with the result reached by the majority, but the holding that the defendants had a common-law duty to reasonably secure outdoor personal property should be narrowly construed to the facts of this case. There may be a point when public-policy considerations would intervene to narrow the duty to exclude some items of personal property placed outside a home. Also, summary judgment should be denied because the facts are unclear on how the wind could have moved the trampoline, not because of an unsupported conclusion that a reasonable person should have known wind could lift the trampoline. More facts are needed to make that determination.

Thompson v. Kaczinski

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