Thompson v. Hebdon
140 S.Ct. 348, 205 L. Ed. 2d 245 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
When evaluating the constitutionality of campaign contribution limits under the First Amendment, courts must apply the precedent set in Randall v. Sorrell and consider its identified 'danger signs' that indicate a limit may be unconstitutionally low.
Facts:
- Alaska state law imposes a limit of $500 per year that any individual can contribute to a political candidate or to an election-oriented group that is not a political party.
- Aaron Downing and Jim Crawford are residents of Alaska.
- In 2015, both Downing and Crawford contributed the maximum amount of $500 permitted under Alaska law to the candidates or groups of their choice.
- Downing and Crawford wished to contribute more than the $500 limit but were legally barred from doing so by the statute.
Procedural Posture:
- Aaron Downing and Jim Crawford sued members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, challenging the state's contribution limits.
- The District Court upheld the contribution limits.
- Downing and Crawford, as appellants, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the limits were constitutional.
- Downing and Crawford, as petitioners, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Did the Ninth Circuit err by upholding Alaska's campaign contribution limits without applying the 'danger signs' analysis from Randall v. Sorrell?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The Ninth Circuit erred by declining to apply the analysis from Randall v. Sorrell, which provides the proper framework for reviewing whether campaign contribution limits are unconstitutionally low. The court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded it was not bound by Randall because it was a plurality opinion, a position contrary to ten other Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court highlighted that Alaska's law exhibits several of the 'danger signs' identified in Randall: 1) the $500 limit is substantially lower than limits the Supreme Court has previously upheld (less than two-thirds of the inflation-adjusted limit upheld in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC); 2) it is substantially lower than comparable limits in other states, making it the most restrictive in the nation for gubernatorial candidates; and 3) the limit has not been adjusted for inflation since it was enacted in 1996, meaning its real value has steadily decreased. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct this analysis, its judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. Justice Ginsburg agreed that a remand to take account of Randall v. Sorrell was appropriate. However, she wrote separately to note that Alaska's law may be distinguishable from the Vermont law struck down in Randall. She pointed out that Alaska may have 'special justification' for its low limits, given that it has the second smallest legislature in the country and its economy is uniquely dominated by the oil and gas industry, making it 'highly, if not uniquely, vulnerable to corruption.' These factors, she suggested, could warrant the state's low contribution limit upon reconsideration by the lower court.
Analysis:
This per curiam opinion serves as a strong directive for lower courts to adhere to Supreme Court precedent, even when it originates from a plurality opinion that has gained widespread acceptance, such as Randall v. Sorrell. The decision reinforces the 'danger signs' test as the primary analytical framework for First Amendment challenges to low contribution limits. By vacating the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court signals a continuing skepticism toward campaign finance laws that impose very low, unindexed contribution caps, making such laws more vulnerable to constitutional challenges. The ruling emphasizes that states must provide strong, specific justifications for unusually restrictive limits on political speech through contributions.
