Thompson v. County of Alameda
27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A public entity has no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an individual who has made generalized threats of harm directed at nonspecific, non-identifiable victims; the duty to warn arises only when a threat is made against a specific or readily identifiable victim.
Facts:
- James F., a juvenile offender, was in the custody and control of the County of Alameda.
- The County was aware that James had 'extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young children.'
- The County knew that James had 'indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood.'
- James did not identify any specific child as his intended victim.
- The County released James on temporary leave into his mother's custody at her home.
- The County did not warn James's mother, the local police department, or parents of young children in the immediate vicinity of James's known propensities or his threat.
- Within 24 hours of his release, James murdered the plaintiffs' young son.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs, parents of the deceased child, sued the County of Alameda in a California trial court.
- The County of Alameda filed a general demurrer, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was protected by governmental immunity.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the County.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of California, with the County of Alameda as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a public entity have a duty to warn the public, local police, or an offender's custodian of the release of a juvenile offender who has made generalized threats of violence against nonspecific victims?
Opinions:
Majority - Richardson, J.
No, a public entity does not have a duty to warn of the release of an offender who has made only generalized threats against non-identifiable victims. The court reasoned that while a 'special relationship' can create a duty to control conduct or warn of danger, that duty is limited to situations where there is a foreseeable and readily identifiable victim. Unlike the specific, targeted victim in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, the threat here was to a large, amorphous group ('a young child residing in the neighborhood'), making the specific victim unforeseeable. Imposing a broader duty to issue generalized warnings would be impractical, produce a 'cacophony of warnings' that would be ineffective, and undermine the rehabilitative goals of parole and probation by stigmatizing offenders. The court also held that the county's decisions regarding James's release and custodial arrangement were discretionary acts protected by statutory governmental immunity.
Dissenting - Tobriner, J.
Yes, a public entity has a duty of reasonable care which may include warning the offender's custodian of generalized threats of violence. The dissent argued that the majority misread Tarasoff, stating that the duty of care arises from the 'special relationship' between the County and the dangerous person in its custody, not from the existence of an identifiable victim. The victim was a foreseeable member of the class of persons threatened ('a young child residing in the neighborhood'). The dissent contended that the County's duty of reasonable care required it to take necessary steps to avert danger, which, in this case, meant at minimum warning James's mother, who as his custodian could have then exercised greater control and supervision to prevent the harm.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the 'duty to warn' doctrine established in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California. By requiring a 'readily identifiable victim,' the court created a critical limitation on the liability of public entities for crimes committed by individuals released from their custody. The ruling establishes that the government is not an insurer of public safety against all harm from parolees; rather, its duty to protect is triggered only when a specific danger to a specific person is known. This precedent makes it much more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in negligence actions against the government unless they can show the victim was a specific and foreseeable target of the offender's threats.
