Thomas v. Phone Directories Co.
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3329, 996 F. Supp. 1364, 1998 WL 121588 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
In Utah, a direct victim seeking to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) is not required to show fear of physical harm but must demonstrate that the emotional damage manifested itself in physical symptoms, as mental illness alone is insufficient under existing state law.
Facts:
- Marilyn Thomas claimed to be a direct victim of harassment, leading to a legal dispute over negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Thomas alleged she suffered emotional distress as a result of the harassment.
- The defendant argued that Thomas was required to demonstrate fear of physical harm for her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
- The defendant also contended that Thomas failed to plead any physical harm resulting from the alleged emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Marilyn Thomas filed a lawsuit, including a Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, against a defendant and Marc Bingham individually.
- Plaintiff Marilyn Thomas stipulated to the dismissal of Marc Bingham as a defendant in all Title VII causes of action in his individual capacity.
- The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in the United States District Court.
- The District Court held a hearing on the defendant's motion and took the matter under advisement.
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Issue:
Does a direct victim of negligent infliction of emotional distress in Utah need to plead fear of physical harm or a physical manifestation of emotional damage to sustain a cause of action?
Opinions:
Majority - Kimball, District Judge
No, a direct victim of negligent infliction of emotional distress in Utah does not need to show fear of physical harm, but yes, such a victim must show that the emotional damage sustained manifested itself in physical symptoms. The court distinguished the present case from 'zone of danger' cases like Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., where plaintiffs were bystanders and required to be in fear of physical harm. Citing Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313, the court clarified that there is a clear distinction between bystander and direct victim cases, and direct victims are not required to show fear of physical harm. However, the court further reasoned that while Justice Durham's opinion in Hansen suggested mental illness without physical symptoms might suffice in severe cases, Justice Zimmerman's plurality opinion explicitly disagreed, stating that this question had not been fully answered by the Utah court. Therefore, the court concluded that under the current state of Utah law, as set forth in Johnson v. Rogers, absent physical manifestations of mental illness, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Since Marilyn Thomas had not sufficiently pleaded a physical manifestation of her emotional damage, her claim was dismissed without prejudice.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinction between direct and bystander victims in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in Utah, emphasizing that direct victims are not subject to the 'fear of physical harm' requirement applicable to bystander cases. However, it strongly reaffirms the existing legal standard in Utah that emotional distress must manifest in physical symptoms to be actionable, resolving ambiguity left by prior cases like Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply. This ruling limits the scope of NIED claims for direct victims by requiring observable physical symptoms, potentially making it more challenging for plaintiffs to recover for purely psychological injuries until Utah's highest court definitively addresses the issue.
