Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas

Majority - Keith P. Ellison, District Judge

No, probable cause to arrest Thomas for terroristic threat did not exist because the officers were aware of facts that conclusively established his affirmative defense of defense of property. The Fifth Circuit has not explicitly decided whether evidence supporting an affirmative defense is relevant to the probable cause inquiry, but other circuits consistently hold that a police officer may not ignore conclusively established evidence of an affirmative defense already known to them, though they have no duty to investigate potential defenses. Thomas's actions were allegedly provoked entirely by the officers' conduct (lurking unidentifiable near his property at night), meaning the officers would have known he was only making a threat in defense of his property. The right to be free from arrest without probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right, and taking the allegations as true, no reasonable officer could have concluded there was probable cause, rendering the arrest objectively unreasonable. Yes, Thomas has sufficiently alleged excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. He claimed that after he complied with orders by placing his rifle on the porch and raising his hands, officers rushed him, threw him down steps, kicked him while handcuffed and face-down, and lifted him by his handcuffs, causing severe pain, torn skin, wrist damage, and loss of consciousness. Defendants' counsel conceded that Thomas sufficiently alleged excessive force for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Yes, Thomas has sufficiently alleged a due process violation for denial of medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleged that Officers Atchley and Allred injured him to the point of unconsciousness and that he received no immediate medical attention, only seeing a nurse two days later who could not provide treatment. Assuming these allegations are true, the officers knew Thomas was unconscious and severely injured but did not ensure he received medical care, meeting the standard of deliberate indifference where the substantial risk of harm would be obvious. Qualified immunity does not bar this claim at this stage, as the right to medical care for pre-trial detainees and the deliberate indifference standard were clearly established. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for claims against Officers Atchley and Allred in their official capacities, as these claims are duplicative of the claims against the City of Galveston itself. Official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the municipality, and a plaintiff cannot expand the scope of municipal liability, which requires a municipal policy or custom, by labeling claims as official-capacity. Claims for false charges were granted dismissal without prejudice, as these allegations were made only in the response to the motion to dismiss and not in the amended complaint itself, but Thomas was granted leave to amend his complaint to include these factual allegations. Claims for retaliation were granted dismissal because Thomas acknowledged he had not stated a claim and agreed to withdraw them. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for the municipal liability claims against the City of Galveston without prejudice, but granted leave to amend. Thomas's allegations that the city had an unconstitutional custom or practice, or failed to adequately train, supervise, or hire officers, were deemed generic and boilerplate. While Leatherman rejected heightened pleading for Monell claims, Twombly and Iqbal require more than conclusory allegations. However, the Court recognized that plaintiffs rarely have access to specific details regarding internal municipal policies or training procedures prior to discovery. Therefore, more than boilerplate, but less than specific, evidentiary-level facts are required at the motion to dismiss stage for municipal liability claims.