Thomas D Esordi v. MacOmb Township

Majority - GADOLA, C.J.

1. Yes, a public employee's 'just cause' employment contract without a termination date is void as against public policy because it deprives a successor township board of its statutory power to appoint and remove public officers. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition on the breach-of-contract claim. Citing Hazel Park v Potter, the court held that a public officer's employment contract that extends beyond the term of the board approving it and provides for just-cause termination, thus lacking a specific end date, is void because it infringes upon a successor board's right to select and appoint its own employees as provided by MCL 41.75a, which states that employees "shall serve at the pleasure of the township board." The court distinguished Davis v Pub Sch of Escanaba, noting that Davis concerned a fixed-term contract for a school superintendent under a repealed statute and did not involve an indefinite "just cause" provision. The court clarified that public policy must be rooted in the state or federal constitution, state statute, or common law, concluding that the Potter rule aligns with common law and the Michigan Constitution's grant of legislative powers to cities, thus not running afoul of Terrien v Zwit or Ingham Co v Mich Co Rd Comm Self-Ins Pool. The court also found Esordi's position to be governmental, not proprietary, subject to the Potter rule. 2. No, the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) against the Township of Macomb, Janet I. Dunn, or Kristi L. Pozzi. Against the Township (for November 2020 termination): While Esordi engaged in protected activity (reporting to the DOJ in October 2019, followed by the memo in January 2020) and suffered an adverse employment action (termination), he failed to establish a causal connection. The termination occurred 10 months after his memo, by a newly elected Board whose members testified they voted to dissolve his dual position due to legitimate conflicts of interest, not his reporting. The court reiterated that "something more than a temporal connection" is required for causation. Against Dunn (for administrative leave and subsequent actions): Esordi engaged in protected activity. However, being placed on paid administrative leave did not constitute an adverse employment action as he received full pay and benefits and returned to the same position with the same pay and benefits. Alleged changes to his work conditions upon return (new computer/phone, lack of certain software, not receiving a credit card, requirement of another employee during meetings) were not deemed adverse employment actions under the WPA. Furthermore, Dunn's development and review of performance evaluations occurred before Esordi sent his memorandum, thus lacking a causal connection to his protected activity. The hiring of attorney Yeotis by Dunn and Pozzi to review evaluations also lacked causation beyond mere temporal proximity, as it was based on negative evaluations and not directly on Esordi's protected activity. Against Pozzi: The court affirmed that Pozzi was not an "employer" or "agent of an employer" under the WPA. Applying the "economic-reality" test and the Elezovic v Bennett standard for "agent" (delegation of general supervisory power), the court found Pozzi lacked control over Esordi's duties, payment of wages, or authority to hire, fire, or discipline him; these decisions were within the Board's discretion and his day-to-day duties were supervised by Dunn. 3. Yes, the plaintiff's public policy-based retaliation claims are preempted by the WPA because they arise from the same factual allegations as his WPA claim. The court held that the WPA provides the exclusive remedy for retaliatory discharge and preempts common-law public policy claims arising from the same activity. Distinguishing Janetsky v Saginaw Co* (Janetsky I), where the public policy claim was factually distinct from the WPA claim, the court found Esordi's public policy claims in Counts II and IV relied on the exact same general allegations and facts (reporting suspected criminal activity and alleged retaliation in response) as his WPA claim in Count I. Thus, summary disposition of these claims was proper.