No. To sue for this kind of emotional shock, you have to actually be there and see the accident as it happens. The old rules were too confusing and could let almost anyone sue, which isn't fair to people who just made a mistake. We need a clear, 'bright-line' rule: you must be 1) a close relative, 2) at the scene watching it happen, and 3) have an emotional reaction far more serious than a stranger would.

No, but for a different reason. I think the whole idea of letting 'bystanders' sue for emotional pain is a mistake. The old rules and the new rule are both messy. We should go back to a much simpler rule: you can only sue for emotional shock if you were in the 'zone of danger' and were afraid for your own life. Since the mom wasn't in danger herself, she can't sue.

Yes. This new rule is heartless and unfair. It doesn't make sense to say a mother who sees her child dying moments after a crash suffers any less than one who saw the actual impact. The main question should just be whether it was predictable that the mom would be horrified. This new 'bright line' rule is just an arbitrary line that will protect careless people and hurt real victims.

Yes. The court is wrong to throw out 30 years of past decisions. The older cases that the majority is criticizing were decided correctly. This new decision is a big step backward and disrespects the work of previous judges who figured this out.

No, the mom can't get money for being upset in this case. The law has to be clear and fair, and you can't get money just because you're upset after something bad happens to someone close to you. You have to actually be there when it happens, know it's happening, and the person who got hurt has to be someone like your child or spouse. The court also points out that we can't let everyone who feels upset sue, or else there would be no end to who could be held responsible. Plus, just because you can predict someone might get hurt doesn't mean you can always sue for being upset about it.

The rule the majority made is too strict and will be unfair in many cases. If it's predictable that a close relative would be very upset by seeing the immediate results of an accident, even if they weren't there right when it happened, they should be allowed to sue for their emotional pain.

We should get rid of the old rule completely and go back to only letting people sue for emotional distress if they were in danger of getting physically hurt themselves. Trying to decide these cases based on what's predictable has turned out to be a mess and led to unfair results.

I agree with Justice Broussard. The majority is ignoring 30 years of cases that allowed more people to sue for emotional distress. They are being very critical of our old decisions in an unfair way.

No, the mom can't get money for being upset in this case. The law has to be clear and fair, and people can't get money just because they are upset after something bad happens to someone close. A person has to actually be there when it happens, know it's happening, and the person who got hurt has to be someone like a child or spouse. We also point out that we can't let everyone who feels upset sue, or else there would be no end to who could be held responsible. Plus, just because someone can predict that a person might get hurt doesn't mean they can always sue for being upset about it.

Yes, the mom should be able to get money for being super upset even if she didn't actually see the car hit him. The rule the majority made is too strict and will be unfair in many cases. If it's predictable that a close relative would be very upset by seeing the immediate results of an accident, even if they weren't there right when it happened, they should be allowed to sue for their emotional pain.

No, the mom can't get money for being upset in this case. We should get rid of the old rule completely and go back to only letting people sue for emotional distress if they were in danger of getting physically hurt themselves. Trying to decide these cases based on what's predictable has turned out to be a mess and led to unfair results.

Yes, the mom should be able to get money for being super upset even if she didn't actually see the car hit him. I agree with Justice Broussard. The majority is ignoring 30 years of cases that allowed more people to sue for emotional distress. They are being very critical of our old decisions in an unfair way.

—damages "caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff:(1) is closely related to the injury victim;(2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress... beyond that which would be anticipated in …

A witness to an "injury-producing" event may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the witness "is closely related to the injury victim

—there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury

—mother who did not witness accident in which automobile struck and injured child could not recover damages from driver for emotional distress

Thing, however, indicates that: "Absent exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the same household, or parents, siblings, children and grandparents of the victim

In a related context, the Supreme Court itself has cautioned against reliance on foreseeability of injury as a sufficient basis for imposing a duty of care: "It is apparent that reliance on foreseeability of injury alone in finding a duty, and thus a right to recover, is not adequate when the damages sought are for intangible injury

P] olicy considerations mandat [e] that infinite liability be avoided by restrictions that... narrow the class of potential plaintiffs

—and (b) in cases of negligence, if the plaintiff was a " `bystander'"and observed the defendant's wrongful conduct, or if the plaintiff was a" `direct victim'"of the defendant's wrongful conduct

No. A plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness. The flexible "guidelines" established in Dillon v. Legg have created uncertainty and led to an unpredictable expansion of liability. Relying on foreseeability alone provides no meaningful limit for intangible emotional injuries and threatens limitless liability disproportionate to the defendant's negligence. Policy considerations requiring certainty in the law and reasonable limits on liability necessitate replacing the Dillon guidelines with a clear, restrictive rule. Because Maria Thing was not present at the scene and did not contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event, she cannot recover for NIED.

No. The court should overrule Dillon v. Legg entirely and reinstate the 'zone of danger' rule from Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. Both the majority's rigid test and the dissent's flexible foreseeability standard are inherently arbitrary and unprincipled. Decades of case law have proven it is impossible to define a 'sensible or just stopping point' for bystander liability. The interest in freedom from emotional distress caused by injury to a third party, while compelling, is a universal part of the human condition and is not an interest the law can or should protect. The proper rule limits recovery to plaintiffs who were within the zone of physical danger and feared for their own safety. Since Maria Thing was not in the zone of danger, she cannot recover.

Yes. Liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be determined by the traditional tort principles of foreseeability and duty, not by the majority's rigid and arbitrary bright-line rule. The new rule mechanically applies what were meant to be flexible guidelines in Dillon and will lead to unjust results by denying recovery to genuinely injured victims, such as a parent who arrives moments after an accident to find their child dying. A more just approach would allow recovery for the shock of observing the immediate aftermath of the accident, as it is often as or more traumatic than witnessing the impact itself. The proper analysis should use the factors from Rowland v. Christian to determine duty on a case-by-case basis.

Yes. The majority's opinion shows a callous disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis by wrongly criticizing and overturning three decades of established precedent. The cases following Dillon, such as Krouse and Molien, are not sources of uncertainty but are rational applications and developments of bystander and direct-victim liability principles. The majority misinterprets these prior decisions and inappropriately dismisses a consistent line of jurisprudence. The court should adhere to the established, foreseeability-based framework rather than adopting a new, rigid test.

No. The societal benefits of certainty in the law, as well as traditional concepts of tort law, dictate limitation of bystander recovery of damages for emotional distress. In the absence of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff herself, damages for emotional distress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff is closely related to the injury victim, is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim, and as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness. The court also emphasizes the need to avoid infinite liability by restricting the class of potential plaintiffs and cautions against reliance solely on foreseeability of injury as a basis for imposing a duty of care.

The majority's strict requirement that the plaintiff be present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and be aware that it is causing injury to the victim is arbitrary and will lead to unjust results. Foreseeability and duty should determine liability, with a view toward reasonable limitations. A close relative who suffers emotional distress from observing the immediate consequences of an accident should be permitted to recover even if not present at the exact moment of impact.

Dillon v. Legg should be overruled entirely and the 'zone of danger' rule from Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. reinstated. Allowing recovery based on foreseeability alone has proven unworkable and has led to arbitrary and inconsistent results. The interest in avoiding limitless liability justifies denying recovery to plaintiffs, like Maria Thing, who were not themselves threatened with physical injury.

Agrees with Justice Broussard's dissent. Criticizes the majority for disregarding stare decisis and 30 years of precedent expanding bystander recovery since Dillon v. Legg. Argues the majority mischaracterizes and unfairly critiques the court's prior decisions in this area of law.

No. A mother who did not witness her child's accident may not recover damages for the emotional distress she suffered upon arriving at the scene. The societal benefits of certainty in the law, as well as traditional concepts of tort law, dictate limitation of bystander recovery of damages for emotional distress. In the absence of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff herself, damages for emotional distress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff is closely related to the injury victim, is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim, and as a result suffers emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness. We also emphasize the need to avoid infinite liability by restricting the class of potential plaintiffs and caution against reliance solely on foreseeability of injury as a basis for imposing a duty of care.

Yes. A mother who did not witness her child's accident may still recover damages for emotional distress. The majority's strict requirement that the plaintiff be present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and be aware that it is causing injury to the victim is arbitrary and will lead to unjust results. Foreseeability and duty should determine liability, with a view toward reasonable limitations. A close relative who suffers emotional distress from observing the immediate consequences of an accident should be permitted to recover even if not present at the exact moment of impact.

No. A mother who did not witness her child's accident may not recover damages for emotional distress. Dillon v. Legg should be overruled entirely and the 'zone of danger' rule from Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. reinstated. Allowing recovery based on foreseeability alone has proven unworkable and has led to arbitrary and inconsistent results. We find that the interest in avoiding limitless liability justifies denying recovery to plaintiffs like Maria Thing, who were not themselves threatened with physical injury.

Yes. A mother who did not witness her child's accident may recover damages for emotional distress. I join Justice Broussard's dissent and criticize the majority for disregarding stare decisis and thirty years of precedent expanding bystander recovery since Dillon v. Legg. I also contend the majority mischaracterizes and unfairly critiques our prior decisions in this area of law.

Thing v. La Chusa

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot