Thigpen v. Roberts
82 L. Ed. 2d 23, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 127, 468 U.S. 27 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
When a defendant exercises a statutory right to appeal a misdemeanor conviction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the state from bringing a more serious felony charge for the same conduct, as this creates a rebuttable presumption of unconstitutional prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Facts:
- On August 6, 1977, Barry Joe Roberts lost control of his car, resulting in a collision with a pickup truck.
- A passenger in the pickup truck was killed as a result of the accident.
- Shortly after the accident, Roberts received citations for four misdemeanors related to his driving during the incident: reckless driving, driving with a revoked license, driving on the wrong side of the road, and driving while intoxicated.
Procedural Posture:
- Barry Joe Roberts was convicted of four misdemeanors in a Mississippi Justice of the Peace Court.
- Roberts gave notice of appeal, transferring the case to the Circuit Court for a trial de novo.
- While the appeal was pending, a Mississippi grand jury indicted Roberts for felony manslaughter based on the same accident.
- At a consolidated trial, the State dropped the misdemeanor charges and prosecuted Roberts for manslaughter, resulting in a jury conviction.
- The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the manslaughter conviction.
- Roberts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, which granted the petition on both double jeopardy and due process grounds.
- The State of Mississippi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the granting of the writ, relying solely on the double jeopardy argument.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the double jeopardy issue.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause prohibit the prosecution from indicting a defendant for a felony after he has invoked his right to a trial de novo for misdemeanor convictions arising out of the same criminal conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes. The prosecution of a defendant for a felony, following his invocation of his right to appeal misdemeanor convictions arising from the same conduct, is unconstitutional. This case is plainly controlled by Blackledge v. Perry, which established a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the state 'ups the ante' by bringing a more serious charge after a defendant pursues an appeal. The sequence of events—a misdemeanor conviction, an appeal for a trial de novo, followed by a felony indictment for the same conduct—suggests a 'realistic likelihood of vindictiveness' intended to discourage defendants from exercising their appellate rights. The Court rejected the argument that the involvement of two different prosecutors (a county prosecutor for the misdemeanors and a district attorney for the felony) negates this presumption, noting that the county prosecutor remained involved in the felony case and that the presumption can reflect institutional pressures, not just an individual's personal stake.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
The Court should not have decided the case on due process grounds, but should have addressed the double jeopardy question for which certiorari was granted. The Court of Appeals misapplied the Double Jeopardy Clause by focusing on the actual evidence used at trial rather than the statutory elements of the offenses as required by the Blockburger test. Under Blockburger, reckless driving and manslaughter are not the 'same offense' because each crime contains an element the other does not: reckless driving requires the operation of a motor vehicle, while manslaughter requires that a death occur. The majority's avoidance of this issue is an 'unexampled abdication of its responsibility,' and the proper course would be to reverse on the double jeopardy claim and remand for the lower court to consider the due process issue in the first instance.
Dissenting - Justice O’Connor
The double jeopardy claim fails for a more fundamental reason: jeopardy never attached at the first-tier trial. In Mississippi's two-tier system, a defendant has an absolute right to a trial de novo, which effectively erases the initial conviction. The first-tier proceeding is not a true 'jeopardy' but is more akin to 'an offer in settlement of his case.' Because Roberts was never truly in jeopardy for the misdemeanor convictions he immediately appealed, the subsequent felony prosecution could not constitute double jeopardy. The case should be vacated and remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider the Blackledge due process claim.
Analysis:
This case strongly reaffirms the principle of prosecutorial vindictiveness established in Blackledge v. Perry, solidifying its application to situations where a defendant's exercise of appellate rights is followed by more severe charges. The decision broadens the doctrine by suggesting that the presumption of vindictiveness is not necessarily defeated by the involvement of different prosecutorial offices, focusing instead on institutional pressures that can chill a defendant's rights. The opinion is also procedurally significant, as the Court chose to decide the case on due process grounds not raised in the certiorari petition, bypassing the complex double jeopardy question that the lower court had addressed, which drew sharp criticism from the dissent.
