Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp.
2001 WL 1150399, 267 F.3d 1095 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
In an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) collective action asserting a 'pattern or practice' of discrimination, a district court's determination of whether plaintiffs are 'similarly situated' for class certification or decertification must incorporate the two-stage framework for pattern-or-practice cases established by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.
Facts:
- General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC), a unit of General Electric Capital Services (GECS), purchased Monogram Retail Credit Services, Inc. (MRCSI) in 1989, which was later renamed Montgomery Ward Credit Services, Inc.
- Gary Thiessen began working for MRCSI as a credit manager trainee in 1968, held various management positions, and progressed to Band 4 on the company’s pay-grade scale.
- Between May 1994 and August 1996, Thiessen was placed on 'special assignments,' and his position at the Las Vegas facility was slated for elimination in May 1998, with him allegedly not allowed to apply for other positions within GE.
- In 1991, GECC management allegedly began referring to older executive employees as 'blockers' who impeded the advancement of younger employees, particularly those in the Management Development Program (MDP).
- In 1992-1993, Dave Ekedahl (RFS vice-president) and David Ferreira (GECC human resources vice-president) sent memoranda to MRCSI leadership, including Steve Joyce (president and CEO) and Jeff Faucette (human resources vice-president), asking about plans to 'remove blockers'.
- In response, Faucette allegedly directed subordinates to prepare severance and retirement packages for various MRCSI employees over the age of forty, including Thiessen and several opt-in plaintiffs, none of whom had requested such packages.
- At meetings in 1993, Faucette discussed and outlined the 'blocker policy,' instructing human resource managers to identify 'blockers' and carry out the policy through negative employment actions like negative performance evaluations, demotions, and terminations.
- Thiessen alleged he was identified as a blocker and, between 1993 and 1995, was denied a business center manager position, phased out of a national manager role onto special assignment, received downgraded performance reviews, and was denied two other manager positions.
- Defendants denied having a pattern or practice of discrimination, asserting that any discussion of 'blockers' was not implemented as a policy and was expressly repudiated by MRCSI CEO Gail Lanik in the fall of 1994, though Thiessen alleged the policy continued covertly.
Procedural Posture:
- Gary Thiessen filed a charge of discrimination with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on February 5, 1996, alleging a 'White Blockers' policy of age discrimination.
- Thiessen subsequently filed a putative class action lawsuit in federal district court, alleging willful violations of the ADEA and a pattern or practice of age discrimination.
- The district court conditionally certified a class of twenty-three plaintiffs (Thiessen and twenty-two opt-in plaintiffs) in 1998, finding direct evidence of an overall policy of purported age discrimination (Thiessen I).
- The district court excluded eight proposed opt-in plaintiffs from the class, concluding that they could not piggyback on Thiessen's EEOC charge because their adverse employment actions occurred more than 300 days prior to his charge filing or they failed to allege discriminatory treatment within that window.
- At the conclusion of discovery, defendants moved to decertify the conditionally certified class and for summary judgment with respect to all of Thiessen’s claims for relief.
- The district court decertified the class, dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Thiessen’s individual claims of discrimination (Thiessen II).
- Thiessen appealed the district court's decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by decertifying an ADEA collective action class, granting summary judgment on individual claims, and excluding opt-in plaintiffs, by failing to properly consider the 'pattern or practice' nature of the discrimination claims and its implications for the 'similarly situated' analysis, burden of proof, and trial management?
Opinions:
Majority - Briscoe, Circuit Judge
Yes, the district court abused its discretion in decertifying the class, granting summary judgment on individual claims, and excluding opt-in plaintiffs because it failed to properly account for the 'pattern or practice' nature of the discrimination claims and its implications under the Teamsters framework. The court erred in its 'similarly situated' analysis for decertification by effectively making findings on the merits of factual issues (such as the policy's continuation and causal link) that should be decided by a jury or under summary judgment standards. This also deprived plaintiffs of the procedural advantage and presumption of discrimination available in the second stage of a pattern-or-practice case, which significantly impacts the balance of individual defenses versus collective benefits and trial management concerns. For summary judgment, the court improperly applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is inapplicable to pattern-or-practice claims, especially before the first stage issues regarding the existence of the discriminatory policy are resolved. The exclusion of opt-in plaintiffs was erroneous because the district court misapplied the continuing violation doctrine and failed to recognize that in a pattern-or-practice claim, the class should include all plaintiffs whose related adverse employment actions arose during the period the policy was allegedly active, allowing them to piggyback on the lead plaintiff's EEOC charge. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Thiessen to depose corporate counsel, as Thiessen failed to demonstrate that the information sought was unavailable through other means, consistent with the Shelton v. American Motors Corp. rule adopted in the Tenth Circuit.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standards for ADEA collective actions, emphasizing that courts must adhere to the two-stage 'pattern or practice' framework established in Teamsters when plaintiffs allege systemic discrimination. It underscores that the McDonnell Douglas framework is inappropriate for the first stage of such cases and highlights the unique procedural advantages (e.g., presumption of discrimination) that class members gain upon establishing a pattern or practice. This ruling ensures that district courts cannot prematurely resolve factual disputes or individual defenses in the guise of class certification, thereby preserving plaintiffs' right to present their pattern-or-practice claims comprehensively, and defining the temporal scope for opt-in plaintiffs in such actions.
