Thermtron Products, Inc., et al. v. Hermansdorfer, U. S. District Judge
423 U.S. 336 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
An order remanding a properly removed case to state court is not barred from appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) when the district court's remand is based on grounds not authorized by the removal statutes, such as a crowded federal docket.
Facts:
- Two citizens of Kentucky were involved in an automobile accident in Kentucky.
- The other vehicle was driven by Larry Dean Newhard, an employee of Thermtron Products, Inc.
- Both Newhard and Thermtron Products, Inc. were citizens of Indiana.
- Thermtron Products, Inc. did not have an office or place of business in Kentucky.
- The Kentucky citizens filed a lawsuit seeking damages for their injuries against Newhard and Thermtron in a Kentucky state court.
Procedural Posture:
- Two Kentucky citizens sued Thermtron Products, Inc. and its employee (both Indiana citizens) in a Kentucky state court.
- Thermtron and its employee removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky based on diversity jurisdiction.
- The district court judge issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded due to the court's crowded docket.
- After receiving a response, the district court judge issued an order remanding the case to the Kentucky state court.
- Thermtron filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, seeking to overturn the remand order.
- The Court of Appeals, as the intermediate appellate court, denied the petition, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred it from reviewing the remand order.
- The U.S. Supreme Court, as the highest court, granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bar appellate review of a district court's order to remand a properly removed diversity case to state court when the remand is based on the district court's crowded docket rather than on the grounds specified in § 1447(c)?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review of a remand order that is based on grounds outside of the authority granted in § 1447(c). The statutory authority for remanding a case, found in § 1447(c), is limited to instances where a case was 'removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.' The bar on appellate review in § 1447(d) must be read together with § 1447(c), meaning it only immunizes remand orders that are based on the grounds specified in § 1447(c). In this case, the District Court did not question its jurisdiction or the propriety of the removal; instead, it remanded the case solely due to its crowded docket. This is not a statutorily authorized reason for remand. An otherwise properly removed action may not be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy, just as an action properly filed in federal court cannot be dismissed for such a reason. Because the District Judge exceeded his statutorily defined power, his order is not immune from review, and a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel the court to exercise its lawful jurisdiction.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars appellate review of all remand orders. The statute says an order remanding a case 'is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,' without exception for the grounds of the remand. The majority's distinction between an 'erroneous' remand under § 1447(c) and an 'unauthorized' remand on other grounds is unworkable and undermines Congress's clear intent to prevent delays caused by appellate litigation over removal and remand. This decision creates a loophole that will allow parties to challenge any remand order by claiming it was based on an unauthorized ground, thereby frustrating the statutory goal of returning cases to state court as expeditiously as possible. Congress intended to make district courts the final arbiters on remand issues, and it is not for this Court to create an exception to the statute's clear and absolute prohibition on review.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical exception to the long-standing rule that remand orders are unreviewable. By holding that the bar on review in § 1447(d) applies only to remands based on the specific grounds listed in § 1447(c), the Court significantly narrowed the statute's scope. The ruling prevents federal district courts from divesting themselves of jurisdiction for discretionary, non-statutory reasons such as docket congestion. While this protects a defendant's statutory right to removal, it also potentially opens the door to more appellate litigation, as parties can now challenge a remand order by arguing it was based on an 'unauthorized' ground rather than an 'erroneous' application of the correct statutory grounds.
