The Society of Lloyd's v. James Frederick Ashenden

Majority - Posner, Circuit Judge

No, a foreign money judgment from a legal system like England's does not violate the due process requirements of the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, even if the underlying contracts contain clauses that curtail certain procedural rights, because the English legal system itself provides fundamentally fair procedures compatible with an 'international concept of due process.' No, a separate court order explicitly 'recognizing' a foreign money judgment is not required before citations can be issued to aid in its collection under Illinois law. The court emphasized that the Illinois statute makes a judgment unenforceable only if the foreign 'system' (not specific procedures in an individual case) lacks impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process. The English judicial system, being the origin of many American legal concepts and highly regarded for impartiality and procedural rights, unquestionably meets this standard. The court explicitly stated that the suggestion otherwise 'borders on the risible.' Due process, in the context of the Illinois statute, refers to an 'international concept of due process' – a notion of fair procedure basic enough for civilized nations, requiring only 'fundamental fairness' and not strict conformity to every detail of American due process doctrine. Requiring a 'retail approach' that examines specific procedures in each case would undermine the statute's purpose of providing a streamlined method for collecting judgments. The specific contractual clauses (the 'pay now sue later' clause and the 'conclusive evidence' clause) did not violate this international due process standard. The 'pay now sue later' clause, which required payment of the assessment before litigating counterclaims, was deemed reasonable given the dire financial situation Lloyd's faced and was analogous to 'pay now, dispute later' provisions in U.S. law that have survived due process challenges. The English courts' enforcement of this clause was based on an interpretation of the original contract, which the names had effectively waived certain procedural rights by agreeing to, a practice upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases like D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. The 'conclusive evidence' clause, which limited the names' ability to challenge the assessment, was considered a curtailment of substantive rights (or limited procedural rights, like discovery), not a procedural due process violation. The right to pretrial discovery, which the defendants claimed was denied, is not even a fundamental part of the U.S. concept of due process, let alone international due process. Finally, regarding the issuance of citations, the court found no legal or practical basis for requiring a separate recognition order before issuing citations to collect a foreign judgment. The Illinois Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments Act states that foreign judgments, if enforceable, are 'enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state.' Sister-state judgments do not require a separate recognition step, and citations can be issued as part of the collection process, with enforceability being raised as a defense to compliance rather than a prerequisite for commencing the process.