The People v. Harvert Stephens, Also Known as Havert Stephens
28 N.Y.3d 307, 66 N.E.3d 1070 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal noise ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions if it defines "unnecessary noise" using an objective standard and is tailored to a specific, limited context.
Facts:
- Harvert Stephens operated his motor vehicle on a public highway in Syracuse.
- The car stereo in Harvert Stephens' vehicle was playing music at a volume audible over 50 feet away.
- Police officers believed the music emanating from Harvert Stephens' vehicle was audible at least 100 feet away.
- During the ensuing traffic stop, the arresting officers discovered Harvert Stephens was in possession of crack cocaine, some of which was in plain view.
Procedural Posture:
- Harvert Stephens was charged in a trial court (Supreme Court) with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sound reproduction in violation of Syracuse City Ordinance section 40-16 (b).
- Harvert Stephens moved to suppress the crack cocaine discovered during the traffic stop and moved to dismiss the count charging a violation of the noise ordinance, arguing the ordinance was unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
- The Supreme Court denied both Harvert Stephens' dismissal and suppression motions, finding sufficient probable cause for the stop and stating that the Appellate Division should make the determination as to the ordinance's constitutionality.
- At a subsequent bench trial conducted on stipulated proof, Harvert Stephens was convicted as charged.
- Harvert Stephens appealed to the Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court), arguing the Syracuse Noise Ordinance was unconstitutional.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Harvert Stephens' conviction, holding that the Syracuse Noise Ordinance was constitutional.
- A Judge of the Court of Appeals (highest court) granted Harvert Stephens leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does Syracuse Noise Control Ordinance section 40-16 (b), which prohibits creating "unnecessary noise" audible beyond 50 feet from a motor vehicle operated on a public highway, violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine of due process?
Opinions:
Majority - Garcia, J.
No, Syracuse Noise Control Ordinance section 40-16 (b) does not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine because it defines "unnecessary noise" with an objective standard and is tailored to a specific context. The court distinguished this ordinance from the one found unconstitutionally vague in People v New York Trap Rock Corp. by highlighting two crucial differences: first, the Syracuse ordinance defines "unnecessary noise" with reference to "a reasonable person of normal sensibilities" (Syracuse Noise Ordinance § 40-3 [u]), which is an objective standard, unlike the subjective standard in Trap Rock. This objective standard, as established in People v Bakolas, prevents arbitrary enforcement based on individual subjective annoyance. Second, section 40-16 (b) is narrowly tailored to a specific context, limiting its application to sound from a motor vehicle on a public highway audible beyond 50 feet. This specificity provides clear notice to ordinary citizens of what conduct is prohibited and clear standards for police enforcement, consistent with precedents like People v Byron that upheld similar contextual noise regulations.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to local noise ordinances in New York, particularly in distinguishing between subjective and objective standards for "unnecessary noise." It reinforces that incorporating a "reasonable person of normal sensibilities" standard is critical for constitutional validity. The decision provides a valuable framework for municipalities aiming to draft enforceable noise regulations, emphasizing the need for both objective definitions and specific contextual limitations to avoid arbitrary enforcement and ensure fair notice to the public, thereby reducing future constitutional challenges.
