The Pennsylvania
22 L. Ed. 148, 86 US 125, 19 Wall. 125 (1874)
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Rule of Law:
When a vessel violates a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, the burden shifts to that vessel to prove that its fault not only was not a cause of the collision, but that it could not have been a cause.
Facts:
- A steamer and a bark were navigating in a dense fog approximately 200 miles from Sandy Hook, in a heavily trafficked shipping lane.
- Visibility was extremely poor, estimated to be no more than the length of the steamer.
- The steamer was traveling at a speed of at least seven knots per hour.
- The bark, a sailing vessel, was under way, moving at about one mile per hour.
- Contrary to statutory navigation rules which required a foghorn for a sailing vessel under way, the bark was using a bell for its fog signal.
- A bell is the legally prescribed signal for a vessel that is not under way (i.e., anchored or stationary).
- The two vessels collided in the fog.
Procedural Posture:
- The owners of the bark filed a libel (a lawsuit in admiralty) against the steamer in a federal trial court seeking damages for the collision.
- The trial court found the steamer solely liable for the collision.
- The owners of the steamer appealed that decision to an appellate court.
- The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for review.
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Issue:
Does a vessel's violation of a statutory rule of navigation intended to prevent collisions create a presumption that the violation was a contributing cause of a collision, placing the burden on that vessel to prove its fault could not have been a cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Strong
Yes. When a ship violates a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is presumed that the fault was a contributory cause of the disaster, and the burden rests upon the ship to show that its fault could not have been one of the causes. The court found that both vessels were at fault. The steamer was at fault for proceeding at an excessive speed of seven knots in a dense fog, violating the rule requiring a 'moderate speed' under such conditions. The court reasoned that this high speed precipitated the steamer into a position where avoiding the collision was nearly impossible. The bark was also clearly at fault for violating a statutory navigation rule. It used a bell, the signal for a stationary vessel, when as a vessel under way it was required to use a foghorn. The court rejected the argument that a bell was an acceptable 'equivalent,' stating that regulations must be followed with 'close and literal adherence' because different signals convey different, critical information. The court then established a stringent burden of proof: the bark had to show not merely that its fault might not have been a cause, but that it 'could not have been.' Because it is impossible to know if the steamer would have heard a proper foghorn sooner and acted differently, the bark could not meet this burden. Therefore, since both vessels were at fault, the damages must be divided.
Analysis:
This case establishes the landmark 'Pennsylvania Rule,' a critical doctrine in admiralty and maritime law that has been influential in other areas of tort law. The rule creates a powerful, though rebuttable, presumption of causation against any party that violates a statute or regulation designed to prevent accidents. By shifting the burden of proof to the violator to show its actions could not possibly have contributed to the injury, the rule strongly incentivizes strict compliance with safety regulations. The high bar set by the rule makes it very difficult for a party in violation of a safety statute to escape at least partial liability, significantly impacting litigation strategy and outcomes in maritime collision cases.
