The NC State Bar v. Livingston

Majority - Bryant, Judge

Yes, the Disciplinary Hearing Commission’s conclusions that Christopher W. Livingston violated the Rules of Professional Conduct are affirmed, and the five-year suspension of his law license is upheld, because the findings of fact were supported by the evidence and those findings supported the conclusions of law. The court first found no violation of Livingston's due process or equal protection rights, noting he received notice, filed an answer, engaged in discovery, examined witnesses, and made arguments, satisfying fundamental due process. The DHC is not required to deliberate for a specific time, and no prosecutorial misconduct was shown. Next, the court affirmed specific RPC violations: 1. Rule 5.4(a) (Sharing Legal Fees with Nonlawyer) & Rule 8.4(a) (Attempt to Violate RPC): Livingston entered a contract to share fees with CCDN, a nonlawyer, and performed services expecting payment, which constitutes an attempt to violate the fee-sharing rule. The DHC's findings were supported by the contract and testimony. 2. Rule 5.5(d) (Assisting Unauthorized Practice of Law): Livingston conceded CCDN engaged in unauthorized practice of law but continued his affiliation for six weeks after becoming aware, thereby assisting CCDN by allowing it to promote him as an affiliated North Carolina attorney. 3. Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to Administration of Justice) - Lawsuits 1-3: Livingston knew or should have known Bladen County District Court lacked jurisdiction over defendants and failed to name CCDN, LLC, a necessary party. His failure to amend complaints or refile properly, and his subsequent unsuccessful appeal, deprived his clients of legitimate claims, constituting prejudicial conduct. 4. Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to Administration of Justice) - Lawsuit 4 (Class Certification): Livingston explicitly stated in his motion for class certification that he would not provide adequate notice to class members, which is required by fundamental fairness and due process, and North Carolina Supreme Court precedent (Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 1987; Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 2000). This jeopardized his clients' and the proposed class's chances of recovery. 5. Rule 4.1 (False Statement of Material Fact to Third Person) - Voicemail to Arnold: Livingston falsely asserted to attorney Andrew Arnold that he represented a "national class" in a federal lawsuit, which was a material misrepresentation intended to make the litigation appear substantial and coerce Arnold. 6. Rule 4.4(a) (Using Means to Embarrass/Burden Third Person), Rule 3.1 (Bringing Frivolous Claims), Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial) - Lawsuit 5 (Against Opposing Counsel): Livingston threatened to and did file a lawsuit against opposing counsel (Arnold, Bettis, and their firms) without a valid basis in law or fact, as confirmed by the federal court's dismissal (Taylor v. Bettis, 2013). This constituted frivolous claims and conduct intended to embarrass or burden. 7. Rule 3.1 (Frivolous Claims), Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial), Rule 4.4(a) (Embarrass/Burden) - Lawsuit 6 (Against Opposing Counsel): Livingston filed Lawsuit 6 with substantially the same baseless allegations as Lawsuit 5, lacking factual ties to North Carolina for one plaintiff and failing to establish harm. The state courts dismissed these claims (Cullen v. Emanuel & Dunn, PLLC, 2012). 8. Rule 4.4(a) (Embarrass/Burden Third Person) - Threatening Monthly Lawsuits: Livingston's email threatening to file monthly lawsuits against opposing counsel, each with extensive discovery, served no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or burden them and coerce a settlement. Finally, the court affirmed the five-year suspension. The DHC's findings regarding discipline were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, including testimony about the impact on firms' reputations, the significant financial cost of defense (approximately $200,000), and Livingston's prior sanctions for similar conduct (Caraballo v. Bagbeh, 2012). The suspension was justified by the significant harm to the profession, the administration of justice, and specific individuals, in line with the requirements of N.C. State Bar v. Talford (2003). The court also found the administrative costs were permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-34.2 (2015).