The Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co. Inc.
367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876, 1975 Mass. LEXIS 826 (1975)
Rule of Law:
A party who, for its own purposes, brings onto its land and keeps there something likely to do mischief if it escapes, or carries on an abnormally dangerous activity, is strictly liable for resulting harm to others, even without proof of negligence, unless an exception to the rule applies.
Facts:
- The defendant built, constructed, maintained, repaired, and operated a dam on its property.
- The dam impounded waters behind it on the defendant's property for its own purposes and benefits.
- The waters held back by the dam were dangerous and created a risk of harm to the plaintiff's land and property downstream.
- The dam failed, releasing the impounded waters.
- The released waters caused a flood that overran the plaintiff's land, its buildings and structures, and personal property, destroying and damaging them.
- The flood also interrupted the plaintiff's business, forcing it to suspend operations.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a tort action in the Superior Court, including a count for negligence and a count (Count II) for strict liability.
- Defendant filed a demurrer to Count II, arguing that it failed to state a cause of action under Massachusetts law.
- A Superior Court judge sustained the defendant's demurrer to Count II, concluding that recovery for damages required proof of intentional or negligent fault.
- The Superior Court judge reported the question of whether Count II of the plaintiff’s declaration set forth a cause of action known to the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for review.
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Issue:
Does a cause of action for strict liability, independent of negligence or fault, exist under Massachusetts law for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous instrumentality from one's property?
Opinions:
Majority - Tauro, C.J.
Yes, a cause of action for strict liability, independent of negligence or fault, does exist under Massachusetts law for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous instrumentality from one's property, particularly when the activity is "unusual and extraordinary" or "abnormally dangerous." The court affirmed that the doctrine of strict liability, as enunciated in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), has been the law of the Commonwealth since 1868. It clarified that Rylands v. Fletcher established liability without fault for the escape of something likely to cause mischief from land used for one's own purposes, a principle narrowed to 'non-natural' uses by Lord Cairns. The court re-examined prior Massachusetts cases, such as Ball v. Nye, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, Wilson v. New Bedford, Mears v. Dole, and Ainsworth v. Lakin, concluding that these cases either directly applied or expressly recognized the strict liability doctrine, despite the defendant's arguments that they were based on negligence. The court emphasized that the presence of negligence elements in a case does not preclude a plaintiff from recovering on the basis of strict liability, as the choice between theories often depends on trial strategy and proof. It further noted the consistent application of strict liability in other contexts, like blasting and keeping wild animals, which share the same underlying policy. The court clarified that the doctrine applies to "unusual and extraordinary" uses of property or "abnormally dangerous" activities. To determine if an activity is "abnormally dangerous," the court explicitly adopted the factors from Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519-520, which consider the nature and extent of the risk. Based on this, the court concluded that the plaintiff's declaration in Count II, alleging the defendant's operation of a dam impounding dangerous waters for its own benefit, which created a risk of harm and subsequently failed, causing damage, was sufficient to state a cause of action in strict liability under Massachusetts law.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant for definitively establishing and clarifying the doctrine of strict liability, as derived from Rylands v. Fletcher, as a fundamental part of Massachusetts common law. It refutes a long-standing debate and judicial skepticism regarding the doctrine's true nature and applicability in the Commonwealth. By explicitly adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts' "abnormally dangerous activity" test, the court provides a clear, multi-factor framework for lower courts to assess whether an activity warrants strict liability, moving beyond the vaguer "non-natural" or "unusual and extraordinary" language. This framework offers greater predictability for future cases involving potentially hazardous activities and reinforces a policy where certain high-risk, non-ordinary uses of land impose a heightened burden of responsibility on the landowner, irrespective of fault, to internalize the costs of potential harm.
