Texas v. Cobb
532 U.S. 162 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and attaches only to charged offenses. It does not extend to uncharged crimes unless they would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.
Facts:
- In December 1993, Lindsey Owings reported his home burglarized and his wife, Margaret, and their 16-month-old daughter, Kori Rae, missing.
- Raymond Levi Cobb, the Owings' neighbor, was questioned but denied involvement.
- In July 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Cobb gave a written statement confessing to the burglary but denied any knowledge of the disappearances.
- In August 1994, Cobb was indicted for the burglary, and an attorney, Hal Ridley, was appointed to represent him on that charge.
- On two separate occasions after Ridley's appointment, investigators, with Ridley's permission, questioned Cobb about the disappearances; Cobb continued to deny involvement.
- In November 1995, while Cobb was free on bond, his father contacted the Sheriff’s Office to report that Cobb had confessed to him that he killed Margaret Owings during the burglary.
- After his father provided a statement, Odessa police took Cobb into custody, administered Miranda warnings, and Cobb waived his rights.
- Cobb then confessed to murdering both Margaret and Kori Rae, explaining he killed them during the burglary and subsequently led police to their bodies.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond Levi Cobb was indicted for burglary in state court, and the trial court appointed counsel to represent him on that charge.
- Following his confession to murder, Cobb was tried and convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
- Cobb, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the state's highest court for criminal cases.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the conviction, holding that Cobb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the murder charge because it was 'factually interwoven' with the burglary.
- The State of Texas, as petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which attaches to a defendant for a charged offense, also attach to other uncharged offenses that are 'closely related factually' to the charged offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to factually related but uncharged offenses. The right is strictly 'offense specific,' attaching only to the offense for which adversary judicial proceedings have commenced. To determine whether an uncharged crime is part of the same 'offense,' courts should apply the test from Blockburger v. United States, which asks whether each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Here, burglary and capital murder are not the same offense under Blockburger because each requires proof of an element the other does not. Therefore, Cobb’s right to counsel for the burglary did not prevent police from questioning him about the uncharged murders after he waived his Miranda rights.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should extend to uncharged offenses that are 'closely related' or 'inextricably intertwined' with the charged offense. The majority’s adoption of the technical Blockburger test undermines the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of protecting an uncounseled defendant from the state. This rule creates a loophole allowing police to question a represented defendant about the same criminal transaction simply by focusing on an uncharged statutory violation. A 'closely related' test, which considers factors like the victim, acts, evidence, and motivation, better protects the attorney-client relationship and is more consistent with the Court's prior Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No, the right to counsel for a charged offense does not extend to factually related uncharged offenses. While joining the majority's opinion in full, this concurrence questions the underlying theory of Michigan v. Jackson, which invalidates a represented suspect's voluntary waiver of the right to counsel during police-initiated interrogation. A suspect's voluntary choice to speak after receiving Miranda warnings should be honored. The Jackson rule supersedes the suspect’s free choice and serves little purpose when Fifth Amendment protections under Miranda and Edwards are already in place.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by formally rejecting the 'closely related' test used by many lower courts. By importing the strict Blockburger 'same-elements' test from double jeopardy law, the Court provides a bright-line rule for law enforcement. This holding gives police greater latitude to question defendants who are represented by counsel on one charge about other uncharged criminal conduct, as long as those other crimes are technically separate offenses under Blockburger. It places a greater burden on the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda as the primary shield during interrogations on uncharged matters.
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