Tevis v. Tevis
79 N.J. 422, 400 A.2d 1189, 1979 N.J. LEXIS 1204 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
A cause of action for a personal injury tort accrues at the time of the injury, and the running of the statute of limitations is not tolled or postponed by the existence of the doctrine of interspousal immunity. The doctrine of interspousal immunity is a defense to liability, not an element of the cause of action that prevents its accrual.
Facts:
- On May 14, 1973, Michael Tevis physically beat his wife, Janina Tevis, in their home, causing her substantial injuries.
- Following the beating, Janina Tevis consulted with an attorney.
- She also filed a criminal complaint against Michael Tevis in municipal court, which was later dismissed.
- Janina and Michael Tevis were legally divorced on May 22, 1975.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 7, 1975, over two years after the assault, Janina Tevis sued her now ex-husband Michael Tevis in a state trial court for personal injuries.
- Michael Tevis moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
- The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the cause of action did not accrue until the parties' divorce removed the bar of interspousal immunity.
- A jury found for Janina Tevis, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages.
- Michael Tevis, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the suit was timely because the cause of action accrued on the date of the court's decision in Small v. Rockfeld, which it interpreted as abolishing interspousal immunity for intentional torts.
- Michael Tevis, as petitioner, sought certification from the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Janina Tevis also cross-petitioned on a separate issue, and the Court granted both petitions.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of interspousal immunity toll the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim, causing the action to accrue only upon the dissolution of the marriage or the abrogation of the immunity doctrine, rather than at the time of the injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Handler, J.
No, the doctrine of interspousal immunity does not toll the statute of limitations. A cause of action in tort accrues at the time of the wrongful act and resulting injury, not when a legal disability like immunity is removed. The court reasoned that interspousal immunity is an affirmative defense that bars recovery, not a substantive element of the tort itself that prevents a cause of action from arising. A wrongful act remains wrongful even if a common law doctrine temporarily prohibits a lawsuit. A cause of action accrues when the right to institute an action arises, which is typically at the time of injury, and the discovery rule does not apply here as the plaintiff was immediately aware of her injury and its cause. Finally, equitable considerations do not favor tolling, as the plaintiff was not incapacitated and could have asserted her claim during the divorce proceedings under the single controversy doctrine.
Dissenting - Pashman, J.
Yes, the statute of limitations should be deemed tolled until the legal bar to suit was removed. The cause of action should not be held to have 'accrued' until the plaintiff had a meaningful right to seek redress, as filing a suit while interspousal immunity was in effect would have been a 'wholly useless act.' The dissent argued that the definition of 'accrual' should be guided by principles of justice, not mechanical rules. Barring this suit, which was filed only six weeks after the two-year period expired, does not serve the purposes of the statute of limitations, as the defendant was not prejudiced by the minimal delay. The majority's holding improperly elevates an archaic and discredited common law immunity over the fundamental tort principle of providing fair compensation for injuries.
Concurring - Sullivan, J.
No, the claim is barred, but not because of the statute of limitations. The concurrence argues that on the date of the assault in 1973, the doctrine of interspousal immunity was in full effect, meaning the plaintiff simply did not have a valid cause of action against her husband at that time. The subsequent abrogation of the immunity doctrine did not apply retroactively to create a cause of action where none existed before. Therefore, the suit fails because no legal claim ever existed for this past tort, making the statute of limitations analysis irrelevant.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the relationship between procedural bars like statutes of limitation and substantive immunities, establishing that a cause of action 'accrues' when the wrongful act and injury occur, regardless of then-existing legal doctrines that might have made a lawsuit unsuccessful. This ruling prevents the revival of old claims following changes in common law, promoting finality and upholding the policy of statutes of repose. By treating immunity as an affirmative defense rather than an element of the claim, the court discourages plaintiffs from waiting for favorable legal developments before filing suit, reinforcing the need for timely action.
