Tesser v. Board of Education
370 F.3d 314 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
An erroneous evidentiary ruling or improper attorney remark in a civil case is considered harmless and does not warrant a new trial unless the appellant demonstrates that the error likely swayed the factfinder's judgment in a material respect. A trial court's clear, curative instructions to the jury are generally presumed to be effective in mitigating potential prejudice.
Facts:
- Gilda Tesser was an assistant principal for the New York City Board of Education at Public School 177.
- In September 1991, Tesser applied for the principal position at the school but was not selected.
- Tesser alleged she was denied the promotion because she is Jewish and was subsequently reassigned to another school.
- After being reassigned, Tesser filed an internal discrimination complaint and alleges she then faced retaliatory actions.
- Tesser took a one-year leave of absence to work in another district, followed by a year of child-care leave.
- During her child-care leave, Tesser continued working for the other school district in violation of the Board's policy.
- When the Board ordered Tesser to return to her position, she refused.
- In November 1994, the Board deemed Tesser's refusal to return to work as a resignation.
Procedural Posture:
- Gilda Tesser sued the Board of Education in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for religious discrimination and retaliation.
- At trial, the district court admitted Tesser's unredacted joint tax returns into evidence over her objection.
- On July 25, 2001, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all claims.
- The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the jury's verdict.
- Tesser filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing the tax returns were improperly admitted and defense counsel made improper remarks.
- The district court denied Tesser's motion.
- Tesser (appellant) appealed the judgment and the denial of her motion for a new trial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the Board of Education as the appellee.
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Issue:
Do the improper admission of a party's wealth evidence and improper remarks by opposing counsel during summation warrant a new trial when the trial court provided specific, curative instructions to the jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Sack, Circuit Judge
No. The improper admission of evidence and improper attorney remarks do not warrant a new trial if they constitute harmless error. An evidentiary error in a civil case is harmless unless the appellant demonstrates it is likely that the factfinder’s judgment was swayed by the error in some material respect. Here, even if admitting Tesser's unredacted tax returns was an error, it was harmless because the district court gave a clear and powerful limiting instruction, telling the jury to consider the returns only for a narrow purpose related to the expert's testimony on tax consequences and for no other reason. It is presumed that juries follow such instructions, and Tesser offered only conjecture that the jury was improperly influenced. Similarly, while defense counsel's remarks during summation were improper, any potential prejudice was cured by the court's instructions that attorney arguments are not evidence and by the court granting Tesser's counsel's specific request for a remedy—to rebut the argument in his own summation.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high threshold required for overturning a civil jury verdict based on trial errors. It solidifies the harmless error standard in the Second Circuit, placing the burden squarely on the appellant to prove that an error likely affected the outcome, rather than requiring the appellee to prove it was harmless. The decision underscores the significant deference appellate courts give to a trial judge's curative instructions, treating them as a powerful tool for mitigating prejudice from improperly admitted evidence or inflammatory attorney arguments. This precedent makes it more difficult for parties to secure a new trial on appeal, emphasizing the finality of jury verdicts unless a substantial right has been demonstrably affected.
