Terwilliger v. Wands
17 N.Y. 54 (1858)
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Rule of Law:
For words that are not slanderous per se, special damages must be the natural and immediate consequence of the defendant's words, manifesting as an injury to reputation that results in a tangible, material loss. Mental distress and resulting physical illness, without proof that the plaintiff's reputation was damaged, do not constitute sufficient special damages to sustain a cause of action.
Facts:
- The defendant, Wands, spoke defamatory words about the plaintiff, Terwilliger, to several individuals, including a man named Heiper and another named La Fayette Wands.
- Heiper, who was an intimate friend of Terwilliger, repeated the defamatory statements to Terwilliger.
- Others also repeated the slanderous statements, and Terwilliger learned that the 'story was all over the country,' including what La Fayette Wands had said.
- Upon learning of the widespread rumors, particularly those repeated by La Fayette Wands, Terwilliger experienced severe mental distress.
- This distress caused Terwilliger to become physically ill, to the point where he was unable to attend to his ordinary work.
Procedural Posture:
- Terwilliger (plaintiff) sued Wands (defendant) for slander in a New York trial court.
- A judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, Wands.
- Terwilliger, as appellant, appealed the judgment to a higher New York court, eventually reaching the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's physical illness, resulting from mental distress upon hearing that defamatory statements were made about him, constitute special damages sufficient to sustain an action for slander when the words are not actionable per se?
Opinions:
Majority - Strong, J.
No. A plaintiff's physical illness resulting from mental anguish is not the type of special damage required to support an action for slander. The law provides a remedy for slander to protect a person's reputation, not their feelings or physical health. To be actionable, words not slanderous per se must cause special damages that are the 'natural, immediate and legal consequence' of the slander. Such damages must flow from an injury to the plaintiff's reputation, demonstrated by a tangible loss, such as the loss of a marriage, employment, or customers. Illness is not a natural or ordinary result of slander because it does not prove the plaintiff's reputation was actually harmed; it only proves the plaintiff was emotionally distressed by the fear of potential harm. Furthermore, as a general rule, the original speaker is not liable for damages caused by the unauthorized repetition of the slander by a third party, as the repetition is a separate wrongful act.
Dissenting - Roosevelt, J.
This opinion was a dissent without a written explanation of its reasoning.
Analysis:
This case establishes a foundational rule in defamation law by narrowly defining 'special damages.' By rejecting emotional distress and consequent physical illness as sufficient harm, the court firmly tethered the tort of slander to the protection of reputation, requiring proof of a tangible, pecuniary, or material loss. This decision created a significant barrier for plaintiffs in cases where defamatory words are not actionable on their face, preventing liability from depending on the subjective emotional or physical sensitivity of the person slandered. The ruling also reinforces the principle of proximate cause in defamation, limiting an original speaker's liability for unforeseen republications by third parties.
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